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“I believe that the Evil – an acute form of Evil – which it expresses, has a sovereign 
value for us. But this concept does not exclude morality: on the contrary, it demands a 
‘hypermorality’ 
George Bataille, Literature and Evil  
  
 
“The aesthetic will be a pathway towards the fully ethical” 

























































Prompted by the critical void in affect theory about how literary affects are created, the 
present MA thesis aims to analyse the emotional response to negative empathy precisely 
as a literary narratological construction. To do so, drawing on L. Doležel’s conception of 
the theory of mimesis as a “possible-world semantics” and on the subsequent 
understanding of fictional narratives as “parasocial” worlds (Oatley), the main body of 
this MA thesis will consist on a narratological analysis of T. Capote’s In Cold Blood and 
J. Littell’s Les bienveillantes. This examination of both novels focuses on the literary 
devices ―which I have called “empathic builders” ― that promote an empathic 
engagement with negative characters. On the one hand, it reveals in-text negative 
empathy to be a formal phenomenon with a material dimension; on the other hand, it 
exemplifies the capacity of literary texts to enlarge the reader’s affective and empathic 
capacity.  
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On the basis of feminist theory’s focus on corporality and the exploration of emotions 
conducted within queer theory (Hardt 2007: ix), cultural criticism was enriched, at the 
beginning of this century, by a growing critical movement labelled the “affective turn” 
(Clough), a tendency that soon developed into an area of study: “affect theory” (Ahmed). 
As Cvetkovich explains, the integration of the affective turn in academia signified an 
increasing focus on “emotions, feelings, and affect […] as objects of scholarly inquiry” 
(qtd. in Pedwell 2014: 13), an innovative perspective that was mainly a “transdisciplinary 
approach to theory and method that necessarily invite[d] experimentation in capturing the 
changing co-functioning of the political, the economic, and the cultural” (Clough 2007: 
3). One of the most prolific objects of analysis within affect theory was —and still is— 
empathy, an emotional response that has been the subject of a plethora of monographic 
studies not only in cultural criticism, but also in the political or even the scientific fields, 
where the discovery of the mirror-neurons in 1996 caused the rise of the so-called 
“science of empathy” (Pedwell 2014: 40). In what social sciences are concerned, the 
affective turn quickly made an influential mark in literary theory, giving place to a new 
affect-based critical regard by which, as Pedwell notes, “texts [were] revitalized, unveiled 
in their emotional implications and bec[a]me, thus, readable in new ways” (2014: 8). 
Nonetheless, as some scholars have noticed, the literary critique that has come out of the 
affective turn —and of the subsequent “empathic turn” (Pedwell 2014: 61)— has 
revolved around a set of specific themes, to wit the affective reactions of the readership 
and the implications of an affective re-reading of the literary tradition (Keen, Nussbaum)1, 
                                                          
1“It is worth noting here that literary criticism’s increased attention to matters of emotion has predominantly 




the sociopolitical effects of in-text emotions2 (Ahmed) or, especially in the case of 
empathy, the possibility of posterior prosocial action (Hakemulder, Oatley, Kaplan). 
Without aiming to underestimate the fruitful and interesting insights that these points of 
view —mainly devoted to the reader’s reception— offer, I consider that the existing 
literature on the emotionality of literary texts has disregarded what I think is a basic and 
necessary question: how are affects deployed in literature? Or, in other words, by which 
narrative mechanisms/devices do emotions rise out of the text and are transmitted to the 
readership? 
In order to provide a first approach to what I regard as a critical void within literary affect 
theory, the current MA thesis consists on a practical study on how a specific emotional 
response is generated in narrative literature. With the goal of spotlighting yet another 
silence present, in this case, in the “empathic turn”, this investigation is centered on 
negative empathy, a transgressive and conflictive emotion that, as will be argued, has 
factually been deprived of critical attention. All in all, the theses that this research aims 
to advance are three: first, that novels constitute “parasocial” alternative worlds in which 
emotions are exposed and where the reader’s empathic capacities are enlarged; second, 
that the transmission of textual affects in general, and of negative empathy in particular, 
does not only depend on the reader’s disposition, but is materially created via narrative 
devices; and finally, that negative empathy, an emotional response practically unique to 
the fictional milieu, stands as a humanizing and “potentially regressive aesthetic 
                                                          
emphasis on a reader’s sympathetic identification with the feelings of characters in a text is the simple but 
powerful question of ‘objectified emotion’ or unfelt but perceived feeling” (Ngai 2005:28-29). 
2 Despite the semantic difference between affect and emotion —by which “affect” assumes a third-person 
perspective, designating a “feeling described from the observer’s perspective” (Ngai 2005:25) and 
“emotion” constitutes a feeling that “belongs” to a first-person—, both concepts will be used indistinctly 
during the present MA thesis. This terminological decision responds to this research’s subscription to 
Doležel’s conception of the literary world, by which “fictional existence is not only determined but also 
manipulated by the authenticating narrative act” (1988:491). Taking into account that the narrative act 
needs a narratee to come into existence, affects in literature would automatically become emotions, as they 




experience” (Ercolino 2018: 244). Thus, to develop the assertions above and to examine 
the way in which negative empathy is constructed, after having made some previous 
remarks on negative empathy and having briefly explained Doležel’s “semantics of the 
possible worlds” —the mimesis theory from which this study departs—, the current MA 
thesis will undertake a narratological analysis of Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood (1966) 
and Jonathan Little’s Les bienveillantes (2006), focusing on how each of these novels 
gives rise, narratologically, to negative empathy. To round it up, a short contrastive study 
of both narratives will be carried out in order to contest or confirm previous critical 
statements on the creation of “narrative empathy” (Keen) and its negative variant and to 
try to reach conclusions concerning the formation and status of the latter: an emotional 
response that, as will be reasoned, constitutes a paradigm of literature’s capacity to push 
the reader’s affectivity to the edge.  
In what methodology is concerned, the current MA thesis proposes an intersection 
between the theoretical considerations on empathy in the context of “affect theory” and 
the practice of narratology. As has been exposed, the purpose of such a methodological 
dialogue is to give a formal and specific application to the study of “narrative empathy” 
and to collaborate with the investigation of negative empathy in literature. As will be 
explained in the following section, negative empathy has only been examined in the 
recent years by S. Ercolino; as a result, his article “Negative Empathy: History, Theory, 
Criticism” (2018) will be a primary bibliographic source for this MA thesis. Besides, the 
present research will also be informed by theorists of literary empathy, as S. Keen or A. 
Morton, by scholars dealing with empathy and affects in a more general way, as S. 
Ahmed, S. Ngai or C. Pedwell, and by the work of some academics studying the 
juxtaposition novel/empathy from a psychological or cognitive point of view, as J. 




narratology in a coherent way, and to grasp negative empathy as a completely “narrative 
and hermeneutical phenomenon” (Deciu 2016: 52), this MA thesis will draw upon L. 
Dolezel’s conception of the narrative process —or theory of mimesis— as a “possible-
world semantics”. In addition to the ideas of the Czech literary theorist, posterior 
publications applying his work to the understanding of the empathic engagement with 
fictional characters, as A. Deciu’s or M. Caracciolo’s, have also contributed greatly to the 
goals of the present research. On the other hand, the critical analyses of the narrative 
techniques inviting empathy in In Cold Blood and Les bienveillantes, which occupy the 
body of this project, will be conducted in accordance with the terminology provided by 
Gerard Genette in Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method because of its hegemony in 
the field of narratology.  
With regard to the secondary sources dealing directly with both novels, it must be pointed 
out, to start with, that both texts achieved an instantaneous comercial success, which 
reberverated on the interest that they awoke among the literary critics. Nevertheless, the 
focus of their analysis has not been centred on their implementation of negative empathy. 
Thus, on the one hand, the academic research on Capote’s chef d’oeuvre has mainly 
devoted its attention to the innovating new genre that it proposed, “the non-fiction novel”, 
and therefore has largely discussed the position of the novel within the binary opposition 
fact/fiction (Nance, De Bellis, Hill). However, the publications of M. González de la 
Aleja and E. Ortells, which have significantly helped me in the present understanding of 
the novel, deviate from this critical commonplace to delve into the novel’s formal and 
thematic structure, covering partially the lack of attention given to its literary traits. On 
the other hand, whereas the critical work concerned with In Cold Blood is not copious, 
with only one book entirely consecrated to it, Jonathan Little’s Les bienveillantes has 




extension and thematic vastness of this historical novel, the research works devoted to it 
present a great multiplicity of foci, especially concerning the novel’s treatment of 
historical facts (Lyle, Sanyal), its intertextual games (Grethlein, Boisseleau) and its 
aesthetics (Razinsky, Ferdjani, Tame). Among the critical insights dedicated to Les 
bienveillantes, two articles have had a great theoretical impact on my reading of the novel 
as conducted here: Meretoja’s, as she uses the hermeneutical tradition to try to clarify 
how the reader’s engagement with the protagonist may function, and, once again, 
Ercolino’s, as he resorts briefly to this narrative in order to exemplify the theoretical 
dynamics of negative empathy. 
The present MA thesis has directly confronted, because of its object of study, the “long-
standing problem in philosophical aesthetics” (Ngai 2005: 29) concerning the 
subjective/objective status of the affective dimension of literary texts: a problematic that 
seems to reinforce “la disposition de l’œuvre à l’ouverture” by which, according to R. 
Barthes, “l’œuvre détient en même temps plusieurs sens, par structure, non par infirmité 
de ceux qui la lisent” (1966: 22). Even if this MA thesis defends that emotions are 
invariably elicited in the diegesis, the plurality of effects that the affective structure of a 
novel may provoke —which are, as Barthes asserts, already contained in the narrative— 
depend on an act of reading, on a “fusion of horizons” (Gadamer) which is always 
individual. Consequently, the difficulty of exploring in-text emotions lays in the fact that, 
particularly in this area of study, no artwork can be reduced to a single totalizing criterion 
of analysis. The present work is then restricted to the exploration of one of the possible 
interpretations that these novels offer. Nonetheless, as Derrida remarked, literature, as 
well as literary critique, consists on “suspending the real and exploring the limits of what 
can be said and thought” (Derrida 1992, 170). Such is the underlying motivation of the 




novels and in the negative emotion that they explore in order to grasp literature in its 





















2. NEGATIVE EMPATHY: AFFECT AT THE MARGINS OF 
MORALITY 
 
In the context of the affective turn in literary theory explained above, multiple critical 
voices, such as Sarah Ahmed’s or Carolyn Pedwell’s, have focused on re-conceptualizing 
the very definition of “affect”, focusing on the idea that affects are political and cultural 
practices and that, therefore, they “reproduce cultural distinctions, social norms and 
political practices of exclusion” (Pedwell 2014: 2).3 As a result, affects and feelings bear, 
inherently, a sociocultural charge that precedes them and provides them with a pre-
existing  connotation. Under the light of this cultural perception, affects could be 
reducible, as Ngai proposes, either to the category of “ennobling or beatific feelings” or 
to the group of “ugly feelings” (2005:6).4 Within this simplistic taxonomy, empathy, one 
of the emotional states which, as has been explained, has received more critical attention 
during the last decades, seems to belong undoubtedly to the first group, as it is generally 
assumed “that empathy is inherently a good thing” (Pedwell 2014: 96) and so, that “[a] 
person who displays empathy is, it appears, to be congratulated for having fine feelings” 
(Garber 2004: 24). However, this evaluation of empathy neglects the fact that, as all 
emotions, empathy only takes shape “as a part of a web of other feelings, subjects, objects 
and forces” and that it is, thus, “inherently multiple” (Pedwell 2014: 190). The perception 
of empathy as a positive emotional state per se would then correspond to what S. Keen 
calls “mainstream empathy” (2007: 74), meaning the canonical idea of empathy as an 
emotional response that the empathizer is willing to have and the target deserves. 
Nonetheless, as Pedwell observes, this type of emotional engagement presents multiple 
                                                          
3 In her publication The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Ahmed starts from acknowledging “the importance 
of understanding emotions not as psychological dispositions, but as investments in social norms” (2014: 
56). 
4 In the same vein, Pedwell alerts that there exists an “Euro-American affective imperative to eschew ‘bad’ 




deviations, even if those are more easily arisen via “forms of representation such as 
literature”, which “can activate ways of thinking and feeling empathy that may not be 
possible, or easily discernible, through the embodied face-to-face encounter alone” 
(Pedwell 2014: 4). Negative empathy, the intricate and practically unexplored emotion to 
which the present MA thesis is devoted, is, as I hope now to develop, one of those 
dissident forms of empathy that is more likely to emerge in the realm of the fictional.  
Originally coined by the German philosopher Theodor Lipps (Ercolino 2018: 245), 
“negative empathy” was initially defined as “empathy for others’ negative emotions” 
(Morelli, Rameson, & Lieberman, qtd. in Ercolino 2018: 244). Nevertheless, taking into 
account that the label “negative emotions” encompasses emotional states as sadness or 
distress, which are usually also the object of “mainstream empathy”,5 contemporary 
revisions of the concept have re-defined negative empathy as “empathy with those who 
perform atrocious acts” (Morton 2011: 318) or, in relation to literature, “a cathartic 
identification with negative characters” (Ercolino 2018: 244). Therefore, starting off from 
a general description of empathy as a sympathetic “‘understanding’ of someone’s 
feelings, not the ‘sharing’ of them” (Pedwell 2014: 6), negative empathy would consist 
in undertaking this same process with respect to those who commit immoral deeds. As 
noted above, a sector of academia has put emphasis on the idea that, as a cultural practice, 
empathy is “radically shaped by historical relations of power” (Pedwell 2014: 30) and so, 
it may perpetuate prejudice because its “narrow focus” (Bloom 2016: 31) is prompt to 
give preference to people “that we find attractive or and who seem similar to us” (Bloom 
2016: 2). As an emotional practice, negative empathy constitutes then a contradiction to 
these cultural restrictions affecting empathy. 
                                                          
5 “Empathic responses to fictional characters and situations occur more readily for negative feeling states” 




Like A. Morton notices, these constraints that limit the empathic capacity are due, in many 
occasions, to an “internalized code of behavior” (2011: 318) that morally restricts our 
imagination when it comes to humanizing others. Amongst those who have been 
traditionally excluded from the “spotlight” of empathy (Bloom), one paradigmatic case 
is that of “people who does evil”, whom we are “prone to dehumanize” (Bloom 2016:181) 
because of our moral principles. Therefore, negative empathy, in which this Evil other is 
the target of empathic understanding, demands an overcoming of the “moral barriers” 
(Coplan 2011a: xlvii) that normally constrict empathic engagement and fosters an 
epistemological expansion of the focus of empathy, taking the emotional practice of 
empathy towards its moral limits. 
Despite the theoretical challenge that this transgressive emotion poses, as Ercolino states, 
since its first formulation in the 19th century, “negative empathy has received little 
attention by scholars” (2018: 244): a critical gap that, I argue, has not been covered at all 
by the researchers in the field of the recent affective turn. As far as I know, only two 
scholars have directly dealt with negative empathy in the last two decades: A. Morton, 
whose chapter “Empathy for the Devil” (2011) investigates the identification with 
negative fictional characters; and S. Ercolino, the most direct informer of the present MA 
thesis, whose article “Negative Empathy: History, Theory, Criticism” (2018) constitutes 
an ambitious attempt to “to propose a theory of negative empathy that is able to highlight 
its heuristic potential for the purpose of literary analysis” (Ercolino 2018: 244). Other 
than these brief investigations, S. Keen’s Empathy and the Novel (2007), which offers 
one of the most insightful panoramic studies of the intersection between narrative an 
empathy, does mention briefly the possibility of co-feeling with antagonistic figures, but 
without employing the term “negative empathy” or delving deeper into the concept.6 
                                                          




Something similar occurs with P. Bloom’s informational study on the moral limitations 
of empathy, Against Empathy (2016), which elaborates a pugnacious critique of the 
biased practice of this emotional relation in which the paradigmatic case of negative 
empathy is  mentioned but not developed. Finally, well-known scholars dealing with the 
functioning and representation of emotions in a more general way, such as S. Ahmed, M. 
Nussbaum, S. Ngai or C. Pedwell, also inform the present MA thesis. They have 
established useful theoretic tools for the study of non-normative emotions, as would be 
the case of negative empathy, without approaching this concept in particular. A 
representative example of these indirect but fruitful approximations to negative empathy 
would be Pedwell’s theorization of the category “alternative empathies”,7 by which she 
means forms of empathy which escape the “repeated mapping of categories of empathizer 
and sufferer” (2014: 95), that is to say, that reject the canonical scheme of voluntary 
empathizer-worthy target: a heterodox dynamic in which negative empathy fits perfectly, 
even if it is overlooked by Pedwell’s work. Most interestingly, as has already been 
mentioned, Pedwell asserts in her study of these type of “affects at the margins” (2014: 
95) that they are more easily found in literary representations, as, in her words, literature 
“generates possibilities for activating alternative empathies” (2014: 4).  
With this last remark, Pedwell approaches an agreed-on assumption amongst the reduced 
bibliography on negative empathy: that this kind of “alternative empathy” is essentially 
linked to the field of fictional narrative. As has been pointed out, Morton, as well as 
Ercolino, focus their respective analyses of negative empathy on the case of  narratee’s 
identification with non-benevolent literary characters, arguing, like Ngai, that “literature 
may in fact be the ideal space to investigate ugly feelings” (2005: 2), as it “provides safe 
spaces within which to see through the eyes of the psychopath, to occupy the subject 
                                                          




position of the oppressive racist or to share the brutalizing past of the condemned outcast” 
(Keen 2007: 131). This line of argument puts forward the idea that literature would not 
only be better at offering encounters with a more variated range of subjectivities than real-
life experiences, in which our access to and knowledge of this kind of individuals is very 
limited, but would also constitute a “safe space” where the “moral barriers” (Morton) that 
prevent us from empathizing with them could be broken down, giving space to, as 
Ercolino describes it, “a potentially regressive aesthetic experience, consisting in a 
cathartic identification with negative characters” (2018: 244). Nonetheless, through 
which understanding of the process of fictionalization can these last assertions on 
literature be justified and validated? How are affects, and particularly, an “unpleasurable”  
emotional response as negative empathy, deployed and transmitted in narrative? How 
does literature enlarge the readership’s empathic capacity? This vision of literature as an 
alternate and privileged space for affect transmission, where an empathic appraisal of 
immoral subjects is viable, can be assumed without difficulty by resorting to Lubomír 














3. MIMESIS. THE NOVEL AS A PARASOCIAL WORLD  
 
3.1 POSSIBLE-WORLDS SEMANTICS 
 
Based on the Leibnizian philosophical model of “the heterocosmic and the best of the 
possible worlds” (Doležel 1988: 485), and in order to clarify the mimetic theory of 
fictional narratives and its correspondence to reality, literary theorist Lubomír Doležel 
proposes an approximation to mimesis through the so-called “possible worlds semantics”. 
This theory rejects the orthodox “one-world frame”, that considered fictional worlds to 
be dependent on reality for their meaning, and favors a “multiple-worlds frame” (Doležel 
1988: 481) in which “fictional worlds” are understood as multiple “sets of possible states 
of affairs” (Doležel 1988: 482) which are constructed ex nihilo “in the creative act of the 
poetic imagination, in the activity of poiesis” (Doležel 1988: 489). Hence, for Doležel, 
every narrative act determines and manipulates (Doležel 1988: 491) a possible world of 
fiction, which is incomplete (Doležel 1988: 486) but possesses its own internal logics and 
stands, therefore, as a self-contained alternative reality. This “world of the text” (Ricoeur) 
is, at the same time, inhabited by characters, or “fictional particulars”, which “are not 
dependent for their existence and properties on actual prototypes” (Doležel 1988: 482) 
but, who, nevertheless, are, as the rest of their fictional world, “accessible from the actual 
world” (Doležel 1988: 485). This accessibility is viable because, even if the “possible 
world” that the narrative enacts is parallel to the actual state of affairs, it also is, according 
to Doležel, at the same ontological and epistemological level than the former (Doležel 
1988: 485). As a result of this homogeneity between the actual and the fictional, readers 
are allowed to enter a fictional world via “semiotic mediation”, that is, through a “crossing 




possibles” (Doležel 1988: 485). For the Czech theorist, the act of reading, by which the 
possible world of fiction is materialized, permits the narratee to “‘observe’ fictional 
worlds and make them a source of his experience, just as he observes and experientially 
appropriates the actual world” (Doležel 1988: 485). In this sense, the experience that each 
narrative world offers to the readership is also a social one, as every novel includes 
opportunities to know the “fictional particulars” that are described in it, who normally 
constitute the very heart of the narration.8 In addition, the practice of “cross-world 
identification” (Doležel 1988: 483) that is necessary for apprehending the possible world 
enacted by the poiesis sets out the perfect conditions not only for discovering these 
fictional subjectivities, but also for empathizing with them: narratives, following 
Doležel’s considerations, are ways of experiencing a world and its internal subjects while 
“temporarily shifting our own reality out of focus” (Deciu 2016: 68). Our way of 
approximating novels would mirror, thus, the cognitive process of empathy. Therefore, 
in the same way that the narrative reveals itself as a parallel “possible world”, it 
automatically becomes, also, a “parasocial” (Oatley) world, where empathy is, as I will 
now explain, more easily evoked, as the reader is protected by the fictionality of this 
social experience.  
 
3.1 “THE MORAL LABORATORY”: PARASOCIAL RELATIONS IN 
LITERATURE 
 
Starting off from Doležel’s conception of the narrative text as an independent cosmos, a 
group of scholars, as A. Deciu or M. Caracciolo, have attempted to clarify how the “cross-
                                                          
8
 “Mar and Oatley (2008) suggest that human interaction is the most central aspect to literary reading, since 
literary narratives fundamentally deal with relationships among individuals and the navigation of 




world identification” (Doležel 1988: 483) that reading requires may affect the reader’s 
reception of fictional characters. Adding to the theory of “possible worlds semantics” by 
means of Gadamer’s hermeneutical tradition, Deciu remarks how the process of engaging 
with the “possible world” of the diegesis can be described and understood by employing 
the German philosopher’s narrative concepts of “horizon” and “application”. For 
Gadamer, “application” is the weaving in  the novel’s “new situation to what we already 
know” (Deciu 2016: 59), and it is achieved by shifting our “horizon” —our vision of the 
world— to adopt the novel’s own “horizon”, its “possible state of affairs” (Doležel). 
Hence, “application” “involves the adjustment of our familiar frame of reference —
assumptions and expectations— to the frame of reference proposed by or contained in the 
object of interpretation” (Deciu 2016: 60). Even if this adaptative movement does not 
signify the readership’s complete abandonment of their perspective, but rather an 
expansionist “revision of what we have come to expect based on our experiences” (Deciu 
2016: 59); “application” does indeed imply a tendency towards “stillness”, an effect of 
“critical distance” (Gadamer) in observation, by which, because of defamiliarization, the 
readership’s perception of the fictional world slows down and their judgement is 
momentarily suspended (Deciu 2016: 80). This epistemological investment —or 
immersion— in the “world of the text” (Ricoeur), which is strikingly similar to the “other-
oriented perspective-taking” (Coplan 2011a: xxxiv) of empathy, has been regarded by 
scholars like K. Oatley or F. Hakemulder as being of key importance for the empathic 
engagement with literary characters, with whom the reader establishes a social bond 
unique to the narrative experience. 
In general, it is commonly agreed upon among the critical literature that novels are often 
invitations to socialization, “simulations of selves in interaction” with whom the reader 




between reader and character, which Oatley calls “parasocial relations” (2016: 623) are 
exclusive to the reading act not only because, as Oatley remarks, they are one-directional 
—what led Kierkegaard to refer to them as “indirect communications” (Oatley 2016: 
625)—, but also because the “parasocial” world that the diegesis opens appears as more 
free and open-minded than real life socialization.9 According to S. Keen, narrative 
literature extends our empathic capacities because of our perception of its intrinsic 
“fictional status”, that “licenses our feeling responsiveness because it frees us from 
responsibility to protect ourselves through skepticism and suspicion” (2007:106, 
emphasis in the original). Besides, considering that, on the one hand, as Doležel proposes, 
the “possible state of affairs” of a novel displays its own moral rules (1988:482), which 
permit it to deal with social taboos; and, on the other hand, that the reader is more prompt 
to accept such moral propositions due to the “stillness” inherent to the process of 
“application” explained above, fiction will often “lead readers to experiment with forms 
of intersubjectivity they would tend to disfavor in daily life” (Caracciolo 2013:27). 
Hence, the “parasocial” world of the novel can be defined not only as a parallel form of 
sociability, but as an enlarged one. In Gadamer’s words, “the miracle of understanding 
literature consists in the fact that no co-naturality is necessary” (1997: 277). For all these 
reasons, literary theorist J. Hakemulder has described narrative fiction through the 
accurate metaphor of the “moral laboratory”: an alternative social space where “plausible 
implications of human conduct can be studied in a relatively controlled and safe way” 
(Hakemulder 2000: 150), allowing readers “to experiment more freely with taking the 
position of a character different from themselves, also in moral respects” (Koopman & 
Hakemulder 2015: 79). Therefore, it could be concluded that, because of its condition as 
a “safe environment” (Koopman & Hakemulder 2015: 81), empathic engagement is more 
                                                          
9 “The perception of fictionality releases novel-readers from the normal state of alert suspicion of others’ 




easily arisen in narrative than in real-life itself. In my opinion, the possibility of in-text 
negative empathy is a “parasocial” affective relation which is paradigmatic of the 
empathic enlargement that novels enable.  
Negative empathy can be considered, as has been pointed out before, as an effective 
response that is, practically, only tolerable in “the fictionality of narrative’s world-
making” (Ercolino 2018: 250). That is so because novels “allow us to play with moral 
limits” (Ercolino 2018: 25) and may “change our perspectives on unlike persons ‘who 
might otherwise seem subhuman’” (Pinker, qtd. in Keen 2007: xix), challenging, as a 
result, our pre-conceptions of humanity.10 Then, negative empathy, an undesired reaction 
that threads the reader’s “horizon”, appears as one of the most transgressive experiments 
that the “moral laboratory” of fiction may propose, and, therefore, as a clear example of 
the expansion of empathy that the novel may invoke. To summarize, such an 
understanding emotional reception of negative characters would be initially made 
possible: first, by the protective fictionality of the “possible world” of the novel (Doležel), 
that turns the text into a “moral laboratory”; secondly, by its moral freedom, which allows 
the narrative to transgress taboos and deal with immoral subjectivities; and, last but not 
least, by the readership’s relegation of their “horizon” in the process of apprehending this 
alternative “parasocial world” and the negative characters it may include. 
Nonetheless, as Ercolino notes, “[i]t is not only a matter of the by now very well-known 
protective distance, typical of aesthetic experience, which allows us to play with moral 
limits in a safe environment” (2018: 250). All these just-mentioned pre-conditions for an 
empathetic reception of Evil concern exclusively the Ricoeurian moments of mimesis I 
and III,11  and they are not enough for the creation of negative empathy, as the moment 
                                                          
10 “Character-based stories (perhaps especially those of a literary kind) encourage a sense of shared 
humanity as a general mode” (Oatley 2016: 623). 
11 In the first volume of Temps et Récit (1983), the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur elaborates a re-




of mimesis II, that is, the construction of the diegesis, appears as the most determinant 
element in the affective orientation of a literary work. In fact, what makes literary fiction 
“specially good for […] understanding other people’s minds” (Oatley 2016: 625) is, 
according to Feagin, “its style and substance” (2011: 161), meaning the level of 
introspection and description of the subjectivity of an Other that narrative often offers: a 
knowledge which is impossible to get in real-life empathic experiences, and which is 
provided in the novel by means of its literary devices. 
 
3.3 “EMPATHIC BUILDERS”: EMPATHY AND NARRATOLOGY 
 
In general terms, if, as Doležel claims, “fictional worlds of literature are constructs of 
textual activity” (1988: 488), the affective charge that such texts bear is equally displayed 
via the formal and aesthetic characteristics of the textual practice. Therefore, in-text 
emotions would not depend on the author or the narratee’s dispositions, but would be 
evoked by specific uses of written language, which, in novels, “changes into sensations, 
pictures, sounds, smells, and even tastes in our brains, subsequently to be ‘treated like  
any other event by the automatic-appraisal mechanisms to arouse emotions’” (Ekman, 
qtd. in Keen 2007: 88). This hypothesis that narrative devices have an evocative quality 
is also supported by S. Ngai, who in her analysis of “ugly feelings”, turns to Adorno’s 
concept of “tone”,12 that I will be equally employing during the present MA thesis. First 
theorized in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (1958) and further developed by S. Ngai, the 
                                                          
Mimesis I, the conception of the fictional world; Mimesis II, its narratological elaboration through poiesis; 
and Mimesis III, its final realization via the act of reading or reception. See (Ricoeur 1983: 85-129). 
12 “It is worth noting here that literary criticism’s increased attention to matters of emotion has 
predominantly centered on the emotional effects of texts on their readers […] but what gets left out in this 
prevailing emphasis on a reader’s sympathetic identification with the feelings of characters in a text is the 
simple but powerful question of ‘objectified emotion’ or unfelt but perceived feeling, that presents itself 




“affective-aesthetic idea of tone” (Ngai 2005:41) seeks to resolve the “long-standing 
problem in philosophical aesthetics” (Ngai 2005: 29) with the location of emotionality in 
literary texts, by which in-text affects are usually described as a subjective response 
depending on the readers’ attitude. On the contrary, the idea of “tone” separates the 
emotionality of the artwork from its receiver in order to understand the “affective values” 
as an “aesthetic immanence […] something that seems ‘attached’ to an artwork” and that 
is generated by a series of formal aspects (Ngai 2005: 43). Therefore, the concept of 
“tone” studies emotionality as a direct effect of narratological devices.  
The chief role of the formal and the stylistic in the “emotionality of texts” , for which 
“figures of speech” become “crucial” to affect transmission (Ahmed 2014: 13), is even 
more assumed, in the literature on the subject, in what empathy is concerned. M. Smith 
argues that “some features of a narrative […] are especially relevant to empathizing with 
characters” to the point that they become “cognitive protheses” that help in the process 
of “other-focussed personal imagining” (Smith 2011: 109) as they inform of the thoughts, 
emotions, and motivations of the target facilitating the reader’s empathy. Thus, the 
domain of narrative representation would collaborate in setting the environmental support 
for empathy to happen. Nonetheless, despite the reiterated manifestations of the 
importance of literary techniques for “narrative empathy” (Keen) among academics, few 
specifications have been made on the type of devices that invite the establishment of an 
empathic bond with characters. Then, as has been remarked in the Introduction to this 
MA thesis, besides some affirmations on the relevance of “voice or perspective” (Smith 
2011:159), whose accuracy will be put into question at the end of this research, most 
academics in the field of affect theory have coincided in limiting their studies to the 




because there’s no critical vocabulary to describe its forms and structures” (Grossberg, 
qtd. in Ngai 2005: 46). 
However, once again, this not very much studied materialistic construction of empathic 
engagement in the text will be specially relevant in the specific case of negative empathy, 
where the readers’ imagination must be reinforced and “dragged” enough by the narration 
for it to be able to overcome the “moral barriers” (Coplan 2011a: xlvii) that prevent this 
negative empathy to arise in real life. Thus, as Ercolino points out, the potentiality of 
narrative will be determinant for fostering this “unnatural” empathic response, as 
“rhetoric can transform the individual, making her/him believe impossible things and 
drive her/him to good or evil deeds” (Ercolino 2018: 251).  
For all of the above, it seems that the proper way to analyse the construction and 
functioning of negative empathy in narrative is by an intersection of the disciplines of 
affect theory and narratology. As a result, the present MA thesis will undertake a 
narratological analysis of two novels which, as will be argued, seem to point, in their 
affective bearing, towards negative empathy. Due to the limited length of the current MA 
thesis, both analyses will be focused only on the narratological traits —which I have 
labelled “empathy builders”— of both novels that, in my opinion, foster an empathic 
reception of certain Evil characters. The term “empathy builders” was inspired by 
Doležel’s assertion that the “possible world” of fiction is built and determined by the 
textual activity, so that it can be considered a “constructional text” in contrast to other 
“descriptive texts” (Doležel 1988:489). Furthermore, this naming aims to reinforce the 
main thesis of the current MA thesis: that affects in general, and negative empathy in 
particular, do not simply emanate from the text, but are materially constructed and 
promoted via its formal aspects, in a way that they can perfectly be studied through the 




and Jonathan Littell’s Les bienveillantes aspire, on the one hand, to collaborate in the 
study of negative empathy in literature and, on the other hand, to elucidate which specific 
literary devices give rise to negative empathy, covering, then, a critical void in the study 
























4. NARRATOLOGICAL ANALYSIS. NEGATIVE EMPATHY IN 
IN COLD BLOOD AND LES BIENVEILLANTES  
 
From a philosophical perspective, various thinkers, Michel Foucault amongst them, have 
regarded literature as “one of a number of ‘counter-discourses’ partly associated with the 
experience of madness and opposed to an all-encompassing Reason” (Freundlieb 1995: 
301). Then, as exposed in the previous section, as a “possible world” is independent from 
reality, literature is more given to “infringe moral laws” in order to inquire into the nature 
of humanity outside “the limitations of reason” (Bataille 1957: 14). Consequently, as 
Bataille defends, “truly humane literature” (Bataille 1957: 16) is often inclined towards 
Evil. This tendency is, as literary theorists have discussed at length, even more remarkable 
in the American literary tradition,13 where canonical novels such as Melville’s Billy Budd, 
Sailor or Hawthorne’s The Scarlett Letter exemplify the American predisposition to delve 
into Manichean puritan morals and the expressions of sheer Evil. Having a vast tradition 
of narrative dealing with morally reprehensible or ambiguous characters to choose from, 
why is the current MA thesis focused on two novels as chronologically and stylistically 
diverse as Capote’s In Cold Blood and Littell’s Les bienveillantes? The reasons for this 
selection are threefold.  
First of all, the form of Evil that both protagonists epitomize. In both cases, the target of 
empathy in the novel has murder as his major —although not unique— violation of 
morality. If we take into account that, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, murder is 
considered the worst crime that can be committed,14 both novels present radically 
immoral characters whose acts —multiple murder and mass murder—, even if very 
                                                          
13 See Ortells 2009: 24. 
14 The moral imperative “thou shalt not murder” appears in the Decalogue as the first morally-related 




different in their execution, are apparently motiveless, and consequently, inexcusable. 
Therefore, negative empathy is demanded of the narratee, in both cases, under extreme 
circumstances that make it more difficult for empathy to be constructed and achieved 
successfully. In fact, the second reason for the election of these novels is the way in which 
both narratives deal with Evil. In In Cold Blood, as well as in Les bienveillantes, Evil 
does not appear as a remote possibility, a secondary theme or a moral warning confronted 
with a paternalistic tone. On the contrary, and as will be analyzed next, both novels situate 
immorality, at once, at the heart of humanity and at the heart of the narrative, turning the 
encounter with Evil into an aesthetic experience whose violence aspires to “truly inform 
thinking” (Bennett, qtd. in Pedwell 2014: 11). Finally, and in the third place, I regard the 
thematic and formal differences between the two novels as an advantage, in the sense that 
the study and posterior comparison of the diverse ways in which they construct negative 
empathy is variated enough to bring about a more complete panoramic view of how 
negative empathy may arise in narrative literature in general.  
All in all, this section includes two narratological analysis, one per novel, which have 
been organized according to Gérard Genette’s tripartite division of narratological traits in 
the categories of “voice”, “mood”, and “tense” (Liveley 2019: 196). Moreover, an 
examination of the thematic structure of the novels has been included at the end of each 
formal study with the goal of examining how the plot’s contents may contribute to 
generating an empathic affective response. To conclude, a brief comparative study of both 
works will be conducted to elucidate how narrative, in general, may have the potenciality 
of, via its narratological choices, “rectify antagonisms” (Pedwell 2014: 94) by 
challenging the sense of moral decency that, in Coplan’s words, “limits our capacity to 





4.1.  “THE RICH NEVER HUNG”: TRUMAN CAPOTE’S IN COLD 
BLOOD 
 
Published in 1966, Truman Capote’s masterpiece, In Cold Blood, is a narrative 
fictionalization of the multiple murder of the Clutter family in Holcomb, Kansas, in 1959. 
Taking the whole case as its theme, the plot follows the crime, its investigation, and the 
posterior trial and sentence of the murderers. Hence, the events narrated in the novel 
cover from the final hours of the clan ―formed by Herbert and Bonnie Clutter and their 
children, Nancy and Kenyon― and the previous journey of their killers, Perry Smith 
and Eugene “Dick” Hickock, until the execution by hanging of the latter. In order to 
present the episodes that took place during the six years that separate these two series of 
deaths in a chronological and structured way, the narration is divided into four chapters 
of equal length: “The Last to See them Alive”, “Persons Unknown”, “The Answer” and 
“The Corner”. “The Last to See them Alive” alternates a description of the last day of 
the Clutters with the Perry and Dick’s journey from Kansas City to Holcomb, where the 
ranch of the Clutter family stands. The daily routine of the bourgeois family, as well as 
the road trip of the pair of ex-convicts, serves as an excuse to present the characters, 
their interpersonal relationships and their background. Portrayed as the paradigm of the 
nuclear family, the Clutters “represent everything people hereabouts really value and 
respect” (Capote 1966a: 84), particularly Mr. Clutter, the paterfamilias, and his 
adolescent daughter Nancy, “the town darling” (4), on whom the description of the 
family will mainly concentrate. Meanwhile, the ex-cell partners reunite, a while after 
they are granted their parole, to carry out the “perfect score” (43) that Dick has been 
planning for months. This first chapter ends with the car of the criminals reaching the 




therefore eliding the events of that fateful night. The second section starts by introducing 
Al Dewey, the KBI agent in charge of the Clutter case, whose investigations of the 
killing, together with the impact of this case on the Holcomb community, will occupy 
this section. Additionally, “Persons Unknown” follows the steps of Perry and Dick in 
their escape across the States and in Mexico, travels during which the narration 
elucidates, mainly, Perry’s lifetime and his familial past. The next chapter,  “The 
Answer”, continues describing the criminals’ voyage and biographies but, as this 
section’s title indicates, Dewey finally finds “the answer” to his enquiry and captures the 
murderers thanks to the denunciation of a fellow prisoner. During the interrogations,  
Dick confesses and blames his partner for the four murders. Afterwards, Smith assumes 
his responsibility and provides the detailed description of the crimes that closes the 
section. The last part of the novel, “The Corner”, focuses on the murderers’ 
incarceration and, specially, on the subsequent trial process, in which the defendants are 
condemned to the death penalty. Finally, after a brief account of the five years’ time spent 
by Perry and Dick on the Death Row, both are executed by hanging.  
The apparently strictly chronological order of the events in the story responds to the 
initial plan for the novel to be “a journalistic narrative that employed all the creative 
devices and techniques of fiction” (Capote, qtd. in Norden 1968). However, as will be 
exposed in the following narratological analysis, these formal techniques, together with 
fictional structures such as the use of symbolism, will be deployed in the diegesis with 
the intention of orienting the “stream of empathy” towards the fictional characters15 that 
are initially understood as “negative” or antagonistic. In order to examine more closely 
                                                          
15 Even if the characters are based on real-life people, taking into account Doležel’s possible-worlds 
semantics, once people are fictionalized, they belong to the realm of the “possible” fictional world and no 
longer of the “real world”, despite their original reference. As the theorist explains it: “Fictional individuals 
are not dependent for their existence and properties on actual prototypes. It is irrelevant for the fictional 
Robin Hood whether a historical Robin Hood existed or not” (1988: 482). Therefore, from now on, all 




the specific “empathy builders” that generate this peculiarity in the novel’s tone, which 
would contradict the original premise of the objectivity of the literary project, this 
analysis will be divided, as has been explained, in accordance with Genette’s tripartite 
division of narratological traits in the categories of “voice”, “mood”, and “tense” 
(Genette 1980: 29-31). At the end, the thematic structure of the novel will also be 
commented in order to illustrate how the novel’s plot would also work towards fostering 
a potential humanization of Evil, that is to say, towards treating Smith and Hickock “as 
men, not as murderers” (Capote, qtd. in Norden: 1968).  
 
3.1.1 VOICE: REALISTIC OBJECTIVITY  
As Genette presents it, the category of “voice” stands, technically, for the “mode of action 
of the verb in its relations with the subject” (1980: 31). When applied to narrative, then, 
it refers to the level of involvement of the narrating subject in the events of the plot. Even 
if the narrative “voice” in In Cold Blood does not constitute an “empathy builder” in itself 
in the construction of the diegesis, it is relevant to start the present analysis by referring 
to it because of its impact on the aesthetic tone (Adorno) of the novel. In the case of In 
Cold Blood, the degree of subjectivation provided by the “voice” is at its minimum level, 
as the narrator is an example of what Genette calls the “heterodiegetic-extradiegetic 
paradigm” (1980: 248): the third-person narrator deploys a traditional omniscience16 that 
will determine the use of the novel’s “mood” and “tense” because, as will be further 
evaluated in the subsequent sections, it gives the narration access to past and future events 
as well as to the character’s thoughts. As several critics have remarked, this diegetic 
aspect brings the novel close to the style of the French realistic novels of the 19 th 
                                                          




century,17 an influence that is to be felt especially at the beginning of the novel, which 
opens, in a very Flaubertian manner, with a contextualizing gradual description first of 
Holcomb’s surroundings, then of the village itself, and finally, of the Clutter’s house. 
Nevertheless, the demiurge in Capote’s novel, unlike those of the realistic movement, is 
an “omniscient narrator without authorial incursions” (Genette, 1980: 187): a 
characteristic that approaches the “voice” more to the “form of fact” (Kazin 1980: 210) 
typical of journalism than to literary realism. The great influence of the reportage in the 
novel’s “voice” is manifested in the narrative devices used to preserve the impression of 
faithfulness to fact, that prevails in the novel despite its combination with a poetical and 
sensitive rhetoric (Nance 1970: 184). One of the most resounding “voice” techniques that 
journalism abides by would be the inclusion of testimonies given to a witness that is 
referred to as “an acquaintance”, “a friend” or “a journalist” or whose identity is directly 
omitted18 in order to avoid the intervention of a first-person narrator acting as an 
interviewer. All in all, the usage of these journalistic techniques, according to D. Pizer, 
gives In Cold Blood the status of a “documentary narrative” (1971: 106) whose realism 
is accomplished not only by means of literary devices as the latter, but also through the 
“filmic construction” (Murray 1973: 132) of the novel, a deployment of cinematographic 
traits that will be further addressed in this analysis. In what the category of “voice” is 
concerned, this intersemiotic transposition (Aktulum 2017: 33) between literature and 
cinema is noticeable in the similarity between the “voice” and a film camera (Nance 1970: 
186), that seems to display the plot’s events in a rigorous and depersonalized way. In 
addition to reverberating in the style of the novel by delimiting the employment of the 
                                                          
17 For instance, Castro observes that, with this use of the narrative voice, the author “actuó de acuerdo con 
los mecanismos de sustento temático del viejo realismo francés del s. XIX” (Castro, qtd. in Ortells 2009: 
108). 
18 Some examples from the novel would be: “he later informed a friend” (312), “Hickock said, talking to a 
journalist with whom he corresponded and who was periodically allowed to visit him” (323), “Perry once 




narratological traits needed for the wanted effect, the pretended objectivity of this silent 
“panoptical” (Hickman 2005: 465) “voice” will also have a chief effect in the novel’s 
reception, as it creates a pseudo-filmic documental illusion in the reader. Then, as Pizer 
argues, the “documentary” aspect of the novel, that starts in the machine-like transparency 
of the “voice”, “not only creates authenticity but also permits theme to be introduced 
implicitly rather than explicitly. Theme emerges out of what characters reveal about 
themselves in conversation and out of what other people say about them” (1971: 112). 
Unlike in the case of narratives like Les bienveillantes, where, as will be explained later, 
the authoritarian presence of an I-narrator triggers a critical distance (Gadamer) from the 
narrator’s diegesis, here the apparent absence of an interventionist guiding voice makes 
the readership feel at liberty to develop their own impressions. As in documentary 
cinema, the characters in the novel seem therefore to be naturally “re-created as they are 
in life” (Capote 1966b :60) by means of their voices and acts.19 Because of the mentioned 
absence of an external intrusion, these direct speech testimonies, the thematic structure of 
the novel, and its narrative techniques remain as those in charge of conveying an 
impression on the reader.20 Thus, as the analysis of the “mood” will display, the lack of a 
first-person narrator forces the affective contents of the text and its inherent subjective 
tone to be located not only in the character’s speech, but also in the less obvious realm of 
the narratological and the aesthetic.   
 
                                                          
19 E. Ortells marks that: “Capote pretendió crear, mediante la utilización de un narrador en tercera persona 
que intentara pasar lo más inadvertido posible, y que se situase por tanto, fuera del relato, la ilusión de estar 
simplemente transponiendo al medio escrito una realidad exterior no mediatizada por ningún agente” (2009: 
109). 
20 “El riguroso uso de la omnisciencia neutral que hace Capote no elimina la mirada y el juicio del autor 
sobre la historia que relata, pero sí que los torna tácitos, subterráneos; en lugar de opinar abiertamente, 
Capote lo hace de modo implícito en el acto de escoger, configurar y presentar el material de la historia” 




3.1.2 MOOD: MULTI-PERSPECTIVISM AND THE FOCALIZATION ON THE 
OTHER 
If the category of “voice” responded to the question “who speaks?”, and therefore 
referred to the act of telling, the category of “mood” discusses the showing of a narrative 
by answering the question “whose point of view orients the narrative perspective?” 
(Culler 1980: 10) or simply, “who sees?”. The difference between both usually mistaken 
narratological areas (Culler) is made clear in In Cold Blood, where, whereas the “voice” 
of the novel remains constant, the “mood” variates continuously: the narrative 
perspective, or focalization (Genette 1983: 189), adopts the point of view of multiple 
characters during the diegesis. In fact, the dynamic nature of the novel’s “mood” seems 
to contradict the “no-mediatization” of the narrator (Ortells, 2009: 106) by taking the 
form of a “variable internal focalization” (Genette 1983: 191). That is so because, even 
if the use of multi-perspectivism has traditionally been tackled as a literary technique 
promoting objectivity,21 as Ortells argues, the focalization in In Cold Blood is generally 
not “multiple”, but “variable”, that is to say, that the events are not evoked several times 
by different points of view, but the points of view follow one another forming a 
chronological sequence22 which gives an impression of multiplicity. In this way, the 
narration combines the indirect style, typical of the novelistic genre, with direct 
testimonies that give the account a false sense of journalistic objectivity, as the 
focalization is alternated depending on the interest that a piece of information, opinion 
or emotional response may have for the plot. All will be now examined, the novel’s 
                                                          
21 “Capote’s use of multiple varying points-of-view is also consistent with traditional journalism in that a 
reporter also promotes objectivity by presenting differing viewpoints in stories involving conflicting 
positions and beliefs on issues or the perception of events” (Newgaard 2004: 11). 
22 “Si bien la presentación de una multiplicidad de puntos de vista es una de las tretas a las que recurre el 
autor a la hora de crear la ilusión de neutralidad, en la mayoría de ocasiones, no se nos ofrecen diferentes 
versiones de un mismo incidente, sino que diversos individuos nos relatan las múltiples fases de las que 




“skillfull manipulation of point of view” (Hallowell, qtd. in Cañadas, 499) has several 
implications on the “stream of empathy” contained in the text, as the category of “mood” 
is the main repository of “empathy builders” in the narratological construction of In Cold 
Blood.  
Before approaching these “empathy builders”, however, it seems necessary to comment 
briefly on the most remarkable modal construction in the novel: the division of the 
diegesis in two narrative lines and two opposed perspectives. This “method of parallel 
editing” (Murray 1973: 132), that Murray considers the main cinematographic influence 
in the text, although explicitly maintained during the first three chapters, is particularly 
relevant in the first one, “The Last to See Them Alive”,23 in which the focalization 
oscillates between the last hours of the Clutters —with Mr. Clutter and Nancy as the 
main focalizers— and the killers’ trip across Kansas, explained through the perspective 
of both young men. Despite being, in essence, a technique concerning the narrative 
“mood”, this particularity of the diegesis will be further explored in the following section 
of this MA thesis, that deals with matters of narrative “tense” because, as will be 
explained, the effect that this dual construction fosters is, eminently, a temporal one.  
Nevertheless, at a “mood” level, this filmic use of the point of view equates the 
importance of both visions: a horizontalization that lays the foundation for a swinging 
focalization that, throughout the narrative, will progressively tip the scales in favor of 
the criminals, and more specifically, in favor of Perry Smith.   
In addition to the use “parallel editing”, the most relevant characteristic of the use of 
focalization in In Cold Blood is its application of multi-perspectivism.  This multiplicity 
                                                          
23 In fact, the title of this chapter seems to be already alluding to the two narrative lines at the same time: 
on the one hand, the pronoun “them” obviously makes reference to the Clutters, whose dairy routine is 
mostly re-constructed to the testimony of those friends, neighbors, and witnesses who indeed “saw” them 
on their last day. However, on the other hand, the very “last to see them alive” were, inevitably, Dick and 




of perspectives will be especially relevant during the first two sections of the novel, when 
the story includes the point of view of different Holcomb inhabitants in order to give a 
complete panoramic of the crime effects over the Kansas village and its community.24 
In addition to its importance in the presentation of the plot, one of the effects that this 
multi-perspectivism produces on the reception of the novel is that the readership forms 
their own opinion both about the events and about the characters, based on the different 
appreciations coming from characters that have a more or less substantial role in the 
novel. Therefore, the objectivity of the narration remains ambiguous, because, despite 
the absence of an intrusive narrator, the readership’s reception is partially conditioned 
by the valuations of the characters acting as focalizers. The most significant consequence 
of this biased multi-perspectivism for the present study is the production of what I will call 
here an “intradiegetic empathy” directed to the figure of Perry Smith, that is, an ensemble 
of instances in which another character in the novel projects a positive, or even empathic, 
emotional response towards Perry. This input, that molds the figure of Perry in the text, 
will help the readership in building their conception of the character, and so it functions 
as a clear “empathy builder”. 
Apart from the many pleas for Christian forgiveness and empathic understanding that 
the novel includes —which in fact start already in the paratext25—, during the narrative, 
many characters will express the opinion that, despite his criminal acts, Perry possesses 
“something rare and salvable” (Capote 1966a: 41). These compassionate valuations start, 
in fact, with the first in-depth analysis of Smith, provided by the farewell letter written by 
his best friend in prison, Willie Jay, who qualifies Perry as a “man of extreme passion [..] 
                                                          
24
 For instance, when narrating the discovery of the Clutters’s corpses (56-84) the narration turns to six 
different perspectives, namely those of Nancy’s best friend Susan, her boyfriend Bob Rupp, Mr. Helm, 
Larry Hendricks, Mother Truitt, Mrs. Hartman and Mr. Johnson. 
25 The epigraph for the novel is an extract from a poem by François Villon, “Balade des Pendus” (“Ballad 




striving to project his individuality against a backdrop of rigid conformity” who, 
nonetheless, “is his own enemy” (42). Willie Jay’s initial evaluation will indeed set a 
precedent for the following instances of “intradiegetic empathy”, one of the most explicit 
ones being the one highlighted by Nance (1970: 207), in which the motherly figure of 
Mrs. Hickock, who previously distrusted Perry, changes her opinion, and even ventures 
the possibility that Mrs. Clutter would have partaken of her sympathetic vision of Perry: 
“And this boy Perry. It was wrong of me to hate him; I’ve got nothing but pity for him 
now. And you know—I believe Mrs. Clutter would feel pity, too” (279, my emphasis). 
However, perhaps the most relevant evaluation of Perry is that of Al Dewey, not only 
because he is a personal friend of the Clutters and chief investigator of their 
assassination, but specially because his first thoughts about Perry come right after 
hearing the criminal’s extensive explanation on how he committed the crimes. Thus, 
after the confession, Dewey asserts that “he found it possible to look at the man beside 
him without anger—with, rather, a measure of sympathy— for Perry Smith’s life had 
been no bed of roses but pitiful, an ugly and lonely progress toward one mirage” (239, 
my emphasis). As Pizer points out, this emotional realignment, coming from a character 
“whom we have come to admire and trust” (1971: 117), is to be maintained until the end 
of the story: when Dewey assists to the murderer’s execution, after having manifested 
no pity for Dick’s death, the narrator points out that, for the inspector: “Smith, though 
he was the true murderer, aroused another response, for Perry possessed a quality, the 
aura of an exiled animal, a creature walking wounded, that the detective could not 
disregard” (340). As we can see in the quotes above, the emotions that Smith arouses in 
the other characters, “pity” and “sympathy”, are in the spectrum of empathy: a 
compassionate understanding that informs the characterization of the criminal and is 




revelatory considering that, as Newgaard affirms (2004: 14), he is the only one among 
the three primal viewpoints of the novel that has some connection to the Clutters. Despite 
the described multi-perspectivism of the novel, the focalization, especially in the last 
three chapters, will be particularly centered in three figures, who are the protagonists of 
the investigation and the penal process that constitute the center of the plot: Al Dewey, 
Dick and Perry. Importantly for the direction of the “stream of empathy”, and like 
Newgaard also notices,26 this perspective-taking leaves the Clutters’ circle aside and 
focuses its attention on the criminals, and above all, on Perry, who, in his role as the main 
focalizer, stands, in Heyne’s words, as the “thematic and aesthetic heart of the book” 
(1987: 486). 
According to De Bellis (1979: 521), when the pages devoted to him and to his past are 
taken into consideration, Perry Smith is clearly the character with the highest amount of 
testimonies, the main object of the novel’s focalization and its primary interest. In relation 
to this, if we are to follow Keen’s notes on the empathic effects of literary devices, the 
primacy of Perry’s point of view would stand as a main “empathy builder” in the text. 
According to Keen, “what narratologists call narrative situation (including point of view 
and perspective)” constitutes “the second formal quality most often associated with 
empathy” (2007: 29), due to its representation of the character’s consciousness. The 
relevance of focalization for empathic engagement with fictional characters, that Coplan 
also highlights,27 is only preceded, in Keen’s opinion, by a detailed “character 
identification” (2007: 29), a presentation of the figure’s antecedents and thoughts. In the 
case of Perry, this profound characterization will be equally provided by the prioritization 
                                                          
26 “As we can see, none of those three focalizers have a direct connection to the ‘victims’, the Clutters, but 
with their ‘corpses’, while they obviously guard a relationship to the ‘criminals’” (2004: 14). 
27 “Most of the philosophical questions regarding the relationship between readers and characters have 




of his perspective that, in Newgaard’s words, triggers the readership’s sympathy by 
offering “extensive personal background information” (2004:34). 
Thus, by means of the novel’s focalization, the reader is informed that Perry, described 
as “a poet” (Capote 1966a: 41) and a “sentimental” (95), comes from a dysfunctional 
background: abandoned by his alcoholic mother and mistreated by his errant father —a 
familial panorama that cost the lives of two of his three siblings—, he grew up in boarding 
schools and reformatories where, being half-Cherokee, we has bullied because of his race. 
After having spent some time in the army and being without money, a case of thievery 
leads him to prison, where his dreams of becoming an artist and a traveler will definitely 
come to an end. This wretched biography, that is revealed for the first time along the 
twenty-three pages that constitute the two letters written by his father and his sister Bobo 
to the Kansas State Parole Board, will be repeated up to three more times, and in two of 
those occasions, in the words of Perry himself.28 This continuous repetition of Perry’s 
“conditions of emergence” (Butler 2005: 8), which have constructed his subjectivity, 
works within the novel as what Judith Butler coined as “an account of oneself”. For 
Butler, an “account of oneself” can be defined as a speech act in which “I come into being 
as a reflexive subject in the context of establishing a narrative account of myself when I 
am […] prompted to address myself to the one who addresses me” (2005: 15). Hence, an 
account of oneself, that according to Nietzsche, “follows only upon an accusation” (qtd. 
in Butler 2005: 11), necessarily requires an addressee to whom the speaking subject 
explains the “conditions of one’s own life that one could not have chosen” (2005: 19) and 
that help comprehend this subject’s acts and motivations. In Perry’s situation, this 
explanatory narrative is essential, as his explanations about his life of poverty and 
abandonment almost take the form of social determinism (Ortells 2009: 112) in the way 
                                                          




the novel links this traumatic past to his wasted diegetic present via a lack of opportunities 
that the young man himself denounces when he tells his sister: “Please, Bobo. Please 
listen. You think I like myself? Oh, the man I could have been!” (178). The role of the 
interpellated addressee, that in the case of Perry’s account of himself would be embodied 
by the readership, consists therefore in providing an ethical response by recognizing and 
validating the other’s subjectivity. In In Cold Blood, this account is an indispensable 
rhetorical device for the readership to be able to empathize with Perry, because, as Morton 
claims, understanding “the motivation of deeds that one would not consider doing 
oneself” (2011: 324) constitutes a crucial step towards empathising with those who do 
evil. Moreover, as Goldie also explains, the “substantial characterization” of the evil 
Other, with this Other as the narrating conscience, stands as a necessary condition for an 
empathic response (2000: 195). Regarding this, it is also crucial for its reception to have 
the turning point of the novel’s plot —the murder of the Clutters— narrated through 
Perry’s direct speech because, paradoxically, the events of that night are essential in 
characterizing Perry’s nature, as his signs of kindness —tucking Nancy in to appease her, 
respecting Bonnie’s desire to keep her wedding ring, seeking Herbert and Kenyon’s 
comfort—, previously identified by Dewey,29 display his contradictory good-heartedness. 
The narrative focalization on Perry, by which becomes the most important character  in 
the novel precisely by acting as its main focalizer, reveals itself as the most transgressive 
thematic gesture in the novel, makes it possible for the narratee to be familiarized with 
the negative character’s ideas and perceptions, as well as to access his troublesome 
conditions of emergence, from which his violence springs: an ensemble of life 
experiences that “do not excuse what he did […] but it do help explain it” (Capote, qtd. 
                                                          
29
 “Dewey had become aware of several particulars that reinforced his conviction that at least one of the 
murderers was emotionally involved with the victims, and felt for them, even as he destroyed them, a certain 




in Norden 1968). Nevertheless, even if Perry’s point of view predominates throughout  the 
novel, the perspective of Dick, his partner in crime, is, as has been previously pointed out, 
deeply influential as well. The alternation between these two criminal perspectives gives 
room to a comparison between the personalities of both convicts whose effect, after the 
“intradiegetic empathy” delivered by multi-perspectivism and the main focalization on 
Perry, appears as the third “empathy builder” concerning narrative “mood” in In Cold 
Blood.  
Since their presentation, the two young men are described as having, physically, “little in 
common” (28): in clear contrast with Perry, whose “enthralling” face of a “gentle 
romantic” is said to be full of a “roguish animation” (14), Dick is characterized as having 
a “serpentine [left eye], with a venomous, sickly-blue squint that although it was 
involuntarily acquired, seemed nevertheless to warn of bitter sediment at the bottom of 
his nature” (Capote 1966a: 29). As this last quote suggests, and Ortells also points out 
(2009: 130), the narration employs here the naturalist determinism of the 19th century 
tradition to match the criminals’ external appearance to their internal ways of being.30 In 
this way, whereas Perry’s face reveals his “dreamy” and “sensitive” interiority (Capote 
1966a: 157), Dick’s facial features already insinuate the malicious and devious 
personality that his posterior acts will confirm. Hence, by this metonymical portrayal, the 
novel introduces the differences between Perry’s and Dick’s ways of being, an opposition 
that, as González de la Aleja stresses, will increase progressively along the novel.31 
Specifically, it will be through the road trip format that their multiple divergences will be 
                                                          
30 This naturalist comparison between the protagonists will be employed once again in the novel, in a 
passage in which Al Dewey’s wife compares Dick’s face to that of Perry: “and she thought the eyes, with 
their moist, dreamy expression, rather pretty—rather, in an actorish way, sensitive. Sensitive, and 
something more: ‘mean.’ Though not as mean, as forbiddingly ‘criminal,’ as the eyes of Hickock, Richard 
Eugene. Marie, transfixed by Hickock’s eyes, was reminded of a childhood incident” (157). 
31
 “Conforme avanza la novela Dick se va convirtiendo en un personaje cada vez más odioso, mientras que 




further explored (Ortells 2009: 83). Therefore, their escape will serve to contrapose their 
backgrounds and, most importantly, to capture the asymmetrical nature of their 
comradeship: while Dick is only interested in Perry because, due to a lie, he believes Perry 
to be a “natural killer” whose gifts “can help his ambitions” (53),32 Perry sees in their 
association an opportunity to establish a real intersubjective bond. Consequently, the 
union of the criminals is presented as being the result of Dick’s ruse, by which he takes 
advantage of Perry’s need for proximity and of his blind trust in his friend, that leads him 
to innocently believe that “whatever had to happen won’t happen” as long as he and Dick 
“stick together” (120). Dick’s  stratagem becomes obvious when he betrays their mutual 
pact of silence during the interrogations in order to blame Perry: “It was Perry. I couldn’t 
stop him. He killed them all” (222).33 Some pages later, Perry admits to having murdered 
the family. Nevertheless, the robbery at the Clutters’ house was “Dick’s idea, his ‘score’” 
(12) in which Perry accepted to participate not only because he was “afraid to leave Dick; 
merely to consider it made him feel ‘sort of sick’” (120) but also because he was willing 
to visit his friend Willie Jay in Kansas. Finally, Dick, the real artificer of the crime, will 
confess his secret motivation: “I think the main reason I went there was not to rob them 
but to rape the girl. That is one reason why I never wanted to turn back when we started 
to” (270). As a result, the novel’s contrast between Perry, who will prevent this rape from 
happening, and Dick, who fools his comrade into committing a murder, serves to partially 
redeem the former.34 From this perspective, Dick would function as the true criminal mind  
                                                          
32 “Dick became convinced that Perry was that rarity, ‘a natural killer’ (…) It was Dick’s theory that such 
a gift could, under his supervision, be profitably exploited. Having reached this conclusion, he had 
proceeded to woo Perry, flatter him—pretend, for example, that he believed all the buried-treasure stuff” 
(53). 
33 Later on, when they both plan to escape from prison, the different projections that each one has of the 
relationship are again displayed: Perry cannot conceive the jailbreak without his partner and considers that 
“all preparations must include him” (257), whereas Dick plans to leave “alone, of course, Perry’s future did 
not concern him” (255). 
34
 “El contraste que el autor establece entre este y su compinche Dick le va a servir para confirmar al primero 





on whom the blame is put, while Perry’s responsibility for the crimes would be 
relativized: an effect that turns this character comparison into one of the thematic 
“empathy builders” in the narrative. In addition, the unequal terms in which they 
established the relationship with one another, which brings about Dick’s breach of Perry’s 
trust, increases the perception of the latter as an emotionally vulnerable subject, and 
therefore accentuates his benevolent qualities: for instance, despite Dick’s cruel behavior 
and his treason, Perry manifests no hard feelings for his partner-in-crime, but still 
considers him his closest relationship until the end. In fact, during their separate 
incarceration, Perry reports that he “missed Dick” and his great desire was “to talk to 
Dick, be with him again”, because, as he puts it, “they at least were of the same species, 
brothers in the breed of Cain” (251). In effect, after their arrest at the end of the third 
chapter, “the Answer”, Perry and Dick are caught up in a judicial and penal path towards 
a shared end, announced in the title of the last section: “the Corner”, a term used in jail 
slang to refer to capital punishment. However, because of the novel’s temporal structures, 
Perry and Dick’s fate, as well that of the Clutters, give the impression of having been 
progressively approaching since the beginning of the story: an employ of the narrative 
“tense” that transforms the six deaths into a symbolic “inevitable destiny”.  
 
3.1.3 TENSE: AN INEVITABLE DESTINY 
In spite of the importance of the narrative “mood” for the research conducted in the 
present MA thesis, the most extraordinary formal devices deployed by In Cold Blood are 
to be found in its use of the narrative time and its alternations, which influence 
significantly the ordering and reception of the diegesis. As Morrissette points out, it is 
precisely in this temporal choices that the inspiration of cinema over the novel is most 




techniques of the nouveau roman and of cinematic découpage as found in the new 
cinema, including reversals of the chronology of events, parallel or alternating 
sequences, flashbacks, and the like” (1970: 161). Thus, although the narration follows a 
strict chronological order, the sustained insertion of pauses, ellipsis, speed variations 
and, specially, “chronological anachronies” (Genette 1983: 35) turn the novel’s narrative 
time into an intricated structure. So as to make remarks on the main “tense” 
particularities of the diegesis, this section will divide them according to Genette’s sub-
division of temporal dynamics into duration, frequency, and order (Liveley 2019: 196).  
Broadly speaking, in terms of duration, the narration mixes scenes and summaries, two 
diverse speed modes that are combined to highlight the importance given to each 
episode: for instance, while the judicial process in recounted in detail, other apparently 
significant events, like the burial of the Clutters or the years spent by Dick and Perry 
awaiting for their execution in prison, are quickly summarized. Besides, the novel also 
employs recurrent pauses, in a way that the central line of the narrative is frequently 
interrupted to insert biographical documents —a medical report, a journal entry, a letter 
etc.— in an example of another relevant device that relates the novel to the journalistic 
tradition of the reportage. On the other hand, pauses are sometimes used, also, to 
introduce a specific character,35 what constitutes a narrative necessity if we take into 
account the already mentioned multi- perspectivism. The plot also presents two complete 
ellipsis of information, that of the moment of Perry and Dick’s arrest (208) and that of 
their first two years in Lansing’s prison. In relation to this, even if, as Murray asserts, 
“the tempo of the book is faster than the average novel —thanks to its filmic structure” 
(1973: 35), after Perry’s confession, the narrative time becomes more and more 
                                                          
35 For instance, the third chapter starts by providing the biography of Floyd Wells, Dick’s former cell 
partner, who is about to inform the KBI about the authorship of the Clutter’s case: “The young man’s name 
was Floyd Wells, and he was short and nearly chinless. He had attempted several careers, as soldier, ranch 




elliptical, a tendency that reaches new heights during the time in Death Row, where two 
“explicit ellipsis” (Genette 1980: 106) can be identified: “Two years passed” (313), 
“another three years passed” (328). Concerning the night of the crimes, which has been 
previously described as another elided sequence, it could be considered, from the point 
of view of narratology, as a case of partial ellipsis or an “enigma” (Genette 1980: 57), 
as it will be filled later on in the text by Perry’s confession monologue, which functions 
as an internal analepsis providing “deferred or postponed significance” (57) to the 
previously omitted scene. This gap is the most important one for the novel’s plot, as it 
plays a strategic double role in the story, affecting its reception: it maintains the 
readership’s interest in the police investigation, leaving the who and how of the case 
unresolved and so, it also makes the blame for the crimes ambiguous, as the reader 
ignores which percentage of that blame should be ascribed to each of the criminals. This 
dramatic “enigma” plays an important role in the empathic engagement with the negative 
figure of Perry, as it is one of the “empathy builders” present in the temporal construction 
of the novel. That is so because, as Pizer observes, this timing makes it possible for the 
narration to “characterize Perry Smith in depth before revealing his actions at the Clutter 
home” (1971: 116), a structure that makes it easier for the readership to humanize Perry 
and establish a “parasocial” (Oatley) bond with him, as they ignore his degree of 
implication on the murders. Therefore, when the truth is revealed —importantly, once 
again, through Perry’s own explanatory words—, the narratee is already biased by the 
sympathetic portrait of the murderer, and is prompt to, as has been said in the last section, 
regard Dick as truly responsible for the crimes.  
Besides being used, as in this last example, to give “postponed significance” to previously 
void signifiers, the retrospective structure is sometimes employed to retell already 




is what Genette coins as the “iterative” time, meaning “a type of narrative where the 
recurrences of the statement do not correspond to any recurrence of events” (Genette 
1980: 116). Due to the novel’s resorting to the use of multi-perspectivism, these re-
examinations of the plot will appear throughout the novel, generally under the form of 
multiple testimonies relating the same episode. For instance, during Dick and Perry’s 
interrogations (Capote 1966a: 208-239), both criminals retrace all their escape travel for 
the policemen, summarizing honestly or lying about the events already narrated, from the 
perspective of the murderers, in the previous two sections. However, despite the 
multiplicity of particularities in the diegesis’ duration and frequency, the most persistent 
and distinctive temporal asynchronies in In Cold Blood’s narrative time are those related 
to its order, that is to say, its analepses and prolepses.  
On the one hand, analepses occupy, overall, more than a third part of the narration. These 
flashbacks can be either “external analepsis” elucidating the characters’ past —mostly 
Perry’s, whose importance for negative empathy has already been explained—, or 
“internal analepsis” (Genette 1980: 61), that is, dealing with events of the plot, which are 
integrated on an iterative structure. On the other hand, prolepses are used to announce 
upcoming events, a device that reinforces the omniscient nature of the narrator’s voice, 
who has access to the characters past as well as to their future.36 Moreover, the flash-
forwards, which are specially present at the beginning of the narrative, collaborate with 
the “method of parallel editing” (Murray 1973: 132) in conveying “the sense of awe we 
generally feel in the presence of tragedy, in this case a naturalistic tragedy” (Murray 1973: 
134).  
As has been previously introduced, the division of the diegesis into two narrative 
                                                          





perspectives is remarkably relevant in the first section, “The Last to See Them Alive” 
where, thanks to a skillful manipulation of chronological order and duration, the 
combination of the stories of the victims and the perpetrators creates an effect of fated 
disaster. To juxtapose those actions, the novel creates a double chrono-topic dialogue 
alternating between both the focus on the two groups of people and the focus on their 
present and past. By combining their actions with their memories, each one of the six 
characters is introduced in detail37 through a literary construction that combines perfectly 
the horizontal rhythm of journalism and the vertical deepening of fiction described by 
Steinem.38 Despite the analeptic pauses, that appear mostly during the first chapter, the 
speed of the alternation of scenes increases gradually, as in a countdown, as the action 
approaches the moment in which “four shotgun blasts that, all told, ended six human 
lives” (Capote 1966a: 3, my emphasis) could be heard. In this way, the accelerating 
rhythm of the story seems to rush those two opposed realities towards a collision whose 
results will be equally fatal, as the quote asserts, for the six characters. Apart from the 
narrative speed, at least four other devices in the novel help create this impression of 
imminent disaster. First, the dramatic irony39 that results from the anticipation present 
in the novel’s self-explanatory subtitle —“A true account of a multiple murder and its 
consequences”—, which tells reader about the fate of the Clutters and, hence, to perceive 
some of their actions as premonitions. An example of these signs would be Mr. Clutter’s 
signing of a life insurance the same morning of his death and the playful comment of the 
                                                          
37 This is the case of the presentation of Mrs. Clutter, who suffers from a mental illness and who takes a 
miniature from her collection and recalls, “Daddy gave them to me; I had a lovely childhood”, which 
allows the narration to introduce a brief biography, “[t]he only daughter of a prosperous wheat grower 
named Fox…” (25). 
38 “El periodismo se mueve en un plano horizontal, contando una historia, mientras que la ficción, la buena 
ficción, se mueve verticalmente, profundizando más y más en el personaje y los acontecimientos” (Steinem, 
qtd. in Ortells 2009: 32). 
39 The term “dramatic irony” refers to a literary technique, usually employed in theatre, “by which the full 
significance of a character's words or actions is clear to the audience or reader although unknown to the 




insurance agent on Mr. Clutter expected longevity,40 or the admonition on Mrs. Clutter’s 
Bible bookmark, “[t]ake ye heed, watch and pray: for ye not know when the time is” 
(28). Secondly, the tragic atmosphere transmitted by those symbolic instances is ratified 
first, by the description of the inhospitable atmosphere of Holcomb that opens the 
narration.41 In the third place, the anguish triggered by the surroundings is confirmed 
through the insertion of harsh prolepses that announce, explicitly, the forthcoming death 
of the family members. Thus, for instance, when Nancy prepares herself for the 
following day, the narrator adds, “she set out the clothes she intended to wear to church 
the next morning […] a red velveteen dress—her prettiest, which she herself had made. 
It was the dress in which she was to be buried” (55). In the fourth place, the description 
of those last moments of the bourgeois family is usually alternated with that of the 
parallel action of the ex-convicts by connecting both realities through shared factors42or 
circumstances, a technique that Murray, employing cinematographic terminology, calls 
“match-cuts” (1973: 135).43 This filmic resource works as a unifying thread between 
“dos mundos muy distintos y condenados a no entenderse” (González De La Aleja 1990: 
81), but which are also destined to coincide in an inevitable encounter.  
As Pizer points out, although this chrono-topic juxtaposition achieves an especially 
dramatic result during the first section, in which it is oriented towards the narrative 
climax of the novel, this double structure is to be maintained during “Persons Unknown” 
and “The Answer”, which “juxtapose fleeing criminals and pursuing police” (1971:113). 
                                                          
40 “You’re a young man. Forty-eight. And from the looks of you, from what the medical report tells us, 
we’re likely to have you around a couple of weeks more” (46). 
41 “The keening hysteria of coyotes, the dry scrape of scuttling tumbleweed, the racing, receding wail of 
locomotive whistles” (3).  
42 The first transition between both scenarios, which introduces the character of Perry, starts by comparing 
his actions to those of Mr. Clutter: “Like Mr. Clutter, the young man breakfasting in a café called the Little 
Jewel never drank coffee” (12). 
43“A number of match-cuts are introduced in order to impose unity on the apparent discontinuity of the 
action; for instance, as Herb Clutter bends down to wash his face in a sink. Perry Smith, who is to kill him 





Moreover, as the critic asserts, “Part IV contains a less obvious dual sequential 
narrative” (1971:113), deployed through the sustained reference to the gallows, “the 
Corner” that is Perry’s and Dick’s destiny. Thus, throughout the whole novel, “Capote 
creates an effect similar to that in the first three parts —the inexorable coming together 
of two groups or units separated spatially but fated to converge” (1971:114). As will be 
now argued, this aesthetic tone (Adorno) of a “inevitable destiny”, generated by a 
specific interweaving of “voice”, “mood”, and “tense” techniques, affects the 
representation of, first, the confrontation between the Clutters and the criminals, and 
then, of the legal battle between the latter and the American penal system. Hence, this 
omnipresence of “a shaping destiny [that] controls all life” (1971:114) makes the theme 
of the novel transcend, widening it scope from a novel dealing with an isolated case of 
murder, to one that stands as a parable of, as the title of this section suggests, the whole 
American society. This symbolic interpretation, that will be elucidated below through 
the Foucauldian ideas on the genealogy of power, has an extraordinary significance for 
the present analysis of the construction of negative empathy in In Cold Blood. By 
regarding the novel as a parable, its representation of Evil acquires a universal 
dimension, and so, Perry’s fault is scaled down: entrapped in this fatalist an inexorable 
metaphor in which he is a mere symbolic figure, the criminal stops being an agent to 
become, as González de la Aleja puts it, “la víctima de un engranaje legal que acabará 
matándolo” (1999: 89).  
 
3.1.4 THEMATIC STRUCTURE: FACING THE BOURGEOIS ORDER 
 
The collision that the novel weaves patiently during the first section represents, then, not 




co-dependent on and yet ignorant of each other, which can be seen as epitomizing the 
categories that Foucault recognizes within the Bourgeois Order: the Other and the 
Same.44 As Miguel Morey argues in Lectura de Foucault (2014:55) the primary thesis 
of Foucault’s study of the social configuration of madness, Historie de la folie (1961), 
is that the current appreciation of madness is a “produit d’institution” (Foucault 1975: 
352) constructed by the psychiatric discourse which developed during the 19th century. 
Under this light, the Bourgeois Order, a social organization constituted by a series of 
dispositives, designs the discourse of the mad person as the Other  in contrast to which 
the Same can be defined and placed at the core of the Bourgeois Order. From this 
perspective, the Same and the Other are interdependent in their configuration45 but, as 
Foucault states, “selon à la classe où appartient les individus les conduiront au pouvoir 
ou à la prison” (1975: 338-9). The figure of the Other, embodied in In Cold Blood by 
Perry and Dick, is related to class issues and adopts multiple shapes, as the criminal or 
the mad person. Whatever its incarnation, the Other is always condemned to the social 
exclusion and stigmatization that we see exemplified in Perry’s account of himself. 
Hence, the Other at the margins of society functions as the condition of possibility for 
the Bourgeois Order as well as its main enemy, that the Order must isolate and mend. 
Miguel Morey argues in Lectura de Foucault that, “los beneficios que se obtienen por la 
constitución de un delincuente-objeto son múltiples y todos apuntan a mantener un 
equilibrio disimétrico de clase: el Orden Burgués” (2014: 373). However, In Cold Blood 
problematizes this radical separation between the Same and the Other and the stigma on 
the latter not only by giving a voice to the criminal Other, whose first punishment for 
                                                          
44 The terms “Same” and “Other” are extracted from the terminology used by M. Morey in Lectura de 
Foucault (Morey 2014: 78). 
45
 “Así, hacer la historia de la locura es un modo de historiar la articulación de nuestra modernidad, esa 
partición que ordena lo real en dos mitades complementarias, una de las cuales, habiendo sido hasta hoy 




his alterity, according to Foucault, is being denied his right to produce discourse,46 but 
also because the narrative puts face-to-face “dos mitades complementarias” (Morey 
2014: 69), suggesting that their only ontological difference lays, indeed, in their 
conditions of emergence: either the American dream, or the American nightmare.  
This symbolic side of the murders becomes more tangible via the aura of irremediable 
fate that, as has been explained, the novel surrounds the killings with. The destiny of the 
protagonists is transmitted by the mentioned series of “premonitory” devices, but most 
importantly, it is also evoked by Perry’s explicit acknowledgment, as, before committing 
the crime, he feels that “he was here, and embarked on the present errand, not because he 
wished to be but because fate had arranged the matter” (40, my emphasis). Certainly, 
what Perry feels like pre-ordained will be nothing more than the confirmation of the 
augury that his friend Willie Jay writes to him in a farewell letter. The document, 
included in the first part of the novel, constitutes a premonition not only of the crime, 
but of the entire story and its symbolic reading. Therefore, it is meant to resonate in the 
readers’ ears throughout the narrative: 
You are strong, but there is a flaw in your strength, and unless you learn to control 
it the flaw will prove stronger than your strength and defeat you. The flaw? 
Explosive emotional reaction out of all proportion to the occasion. Why? Why this 
unreasonable anger at the sight of others who are happy or content, this growing 
contempt for people and the desire to hurt them? All right, you think they’re fools, 
you despise them because their morals, their happiness is the source of your 
frustration and resentment. (42) 
                                                          
46 En el Clasicismo, la voz del loco se condena a la reclusión puesto que se desarrolla el binomio locura- 
verdad, se la reduce al silencio. Mediante el Encierro en el Clasicismo, la locura se constituye como ‘lo otro’, 




This omnipresence of Destiny, recognized also by Pizer or González de la Aleja,47 
promotes empathy towards the figure of Perry, as the feeling of a superior arranging force 
puts distance, again, between him and his responsibility for the crimes: Perry is 
transformed into a puppet not in control of his own destiny, who encounters in Holcomb 
the denouement that all his unsuccessful life had been preparing him for. He is no longer 
the murderer, but one of the murders’ victims, one of the six human lives that the 
shotguns ended. 
According to González de la Aleja, within this fatal catastrophe that includes Perry, a 
parallelism is established between Perry’s role as victim and that of Nancy Clutter, both 
used as focalizers of their respective narrative line. This implicit comparison, in fact, 
remarks the arbitrary nature of the in fact opposite conditions of the Same and the Other. 
Hence, the critic affirms that in the novel, “[l]a intención […] no es contraponer a Nancy 
y a Perry, sino todo lo contrario: unirlos como víctimas de una misma tragedia, como si 
el destino hubiera cruzado inevitablemente sus pasos con el resultado que el lector ya 
conoce” (González de la Aleja 1990: 75). This comparison with Nancy could be read as 
another “empathy builder” for Perry because it presents as equal the tragedy of these two 
subjects who are condemned to see their life end because of the contrary “conditions of 
emergence” (Butler 2005: 8) to which they are subordinated. Nonetheless, even if both 
are portrayed as victims in the novel, this comparison brings to the forefront, above 
everything, the fact that, despite their shared fate, their place within the Bourgeois Order 
is opposed: Nancy is a paradigm of the Bourgeois Order, of this “happy and content” 
people48 that Perry’s miserable life has led him to envy and hate. In this regard, and 
                                                          
47 “Todos los personajes de Capote aparecen atrapados de una forma u otra por el destino” (González de 
la Aleja 1990: 86). 





following González de la Aleja’s conclusions,49 we could still identify another 
association between Perry and the Clutters, which highlights once again this disparate 
sociological hierarchy: a comparison between the practical and successful Mr. Clutter 
and the dreamy, socially stigmatized figure of Perry. The contrast between these 
characters status is clear once their life stories are narrated: Mr Clutter is the head of an 
exemplary bourgeois family,50 constantly referred to as a model for his community and 
“a proud man” that “made something of his life” (Capote 1966: 73), while his killer, 
Perry, is a young man that, as the narrative constantly repeats, has no family, no friends 
and no material possessions.51 The contrasting nature of their biographical and material 
situations is, moreover, echoed in their intersubjective relations: while Perry is presented 
as having “few personal relationships with other people” but “a great need of friendship” 
(289), Mr. Clutter is presented as an outstanding man in his community, but a cold and 
authoritative figure for his children and wife, whose love he seems to take for granted.52 
As a result, Perry and Mr. Clutter are portrayed as the two sides of the same coin: in a 
metonymical movement, each one of them embodies a different side of the binary 
opposition that is, according to Foucault, at the base of The Bourgeois Order: the 
opposition between normality—the order of the Same for Morey— and abnormality —
the order of the Other. 
In fact, throughout the narration, Perry questions his own normality and worries about 
“a notion that he ‘might not be normal, maybe insane’” (Capote 1966: 257), a 
                                                          
49 See González de la Aleja (1990: 80-81). 
50 Talking about the Clutters, Nancy’s boyfriend, Bobby Rupp, voices the feeling of the whole Holcomb 
community: “There wasn’t any family like them” (48). 
51 During his trip with Dick to Holcomb, Perry ruminates: “He did give a damn—but who had ever given a 
damn about him?” (43). Later in the novel, the psychiatric examination establishes that: “his childhood […] 
was marked by brutality and lack of concern on the part of both parents. He seems to have grown up without 
direction, without love, and without ever having absorbed any fixed sense of moral values” (Capote 1966: 
288-289). 
52 Right after labelling him as “the community’s most widely known citizen” (3), the narration depicts Mr. 
Clutter forcing Nancy to break up with his boyfriend for being a Roman Catholic, arguing that “his laws 




preoccupation he often shares with his partner-in-crime, to whom, when they are 
discussing the murders, he says: “There’s got to be something wrong with somebody 
who’d do a thing like that” (90). Moreover, Perry also recognizes, just like Dick, his 
alienation from the Bourgeois Order, a distance from conventionalism that his friend 
Wille Jay makes explicit by describing him as “an individual without the constant threat 
of conventional pressures” whose ideas are “opposed to conventionalism” (139). 
Therefore, to use Agamben’s terminology, Perry will become conscious of his condition 
as homo sacer: a subject unworthy to be sacrificed but whose life can be taken with 
impunity, because it is a bare life, a valueless life.53 This homo sacer at the margins of 
society is directly opposed to the figure of the sovereign subject at the core of it, whose 
rights are fully recognized: a category that Mr. Clutter embodies in the novel. Hence, 
understanding himself as distanced from social morals and having lost every right 
because of his bare life, Perry develops a feeling of hatred, already diagnosed in Willie 
Jay’s prophecy, towards those who have had the opportunities that society denied him. 
Symbolized through the leitmotif of the parrot in his dreams, “an avenging angel who 
savaged his enemies” (258), Perry’s sense of injustice deriving from his lack of 
opportunities and education generates in him a violent frustration and resentment, that 
he projects towards those integrated in the Bourgeois Order: a motivation for the crimes 
that the novel’s plot itself seems to validate.  
In this way, from the beginning on the novel, the murders are constantly described as 
being “apparently motiveless” (75) by the KBI investigators, who nevertheless consider 
the death of Mr. Clutter to be “the criminals’ main objective” (149), an opinion shared 
by the Holcomb community because “he was the most abused” (76). The thesis 
                                                          
53 “Homo sacer presents the figure of life taken into the sovereign ban and preserves the memory of the 
originary exclusion through which the political dimension was first constituted.[…] What is captured in the 
sovereign ban is a human victim who may be killed but not sacrificed: homo sacer”(Agamben 1998: 53, 




maintained by Al Dewey about the crime’s absurdity seems to be corroborated by Perry’s 
confession of the crimes,54 in which he testifies, “I didn’t want to harm the man. I thought 
he was a very nice gentleman. Soft-spoken. I thought so right up to the moment I cut 
his throat” (237). Nevertheless, as the narrative line moves forward, the crimes begin to 
be presented as a consequence of an emotional breakdown that makes Perry lose control 
of himself and be driven by a so far repressed impulse towards punishing the Bourgeois 
Order: the social organization that condemned him to a bare life and which is personified 
in the Clutters, and specially, in the figure of Herbert Clutter. A scientific article called 
“Murder Without Apparent Motive”, included in the novel, will confirm this idea, 
arguing that when killing Mr. Clutter, Perry was “under a mental eclipse”, destroying “a 
key figure in some past traumatic configuration” (294). Thus, when he ends with 
Clutter’s life, Perry is attacking nothing but the sovereign subject,55 the personification 
of all the authoritative figures in his life that belonged to a bourgeois disciplinary 
dispositive (the nuns that tortured him at boarding school, the doctors that treated his 
physical disability, the agents and guards in prison, etc.), whose discourses constructed 
him as the Other and condemned him to suffering the exclusion inherent to the abnormal. 
Most importantly, Perry himself will finally recognize the assassinations as an 
unconscious revenge against the whole Bourgeois Order, in a moment of anagnorisis 
that is reproduced twice during the narration: “And it wasn’t because of anything the 
Clutters did. They never hurt me. Like other people. Like people have all my life. Maybe 
it’s just that the Clutters were the ones who had to pay for it” (282 & 294, my emphasis).  
Then, the novel’s explanations of the causes behind the crime end up turning  it into an 
                                                          
54 Reflecting on Perry’s confession, the agent Al Dewey asserts: “The crime was a psychological accident, 
virtually an impersonal act; the victims might as well have been killed by lightning” (239). 
55 Ortells seconds this idea by arguing that: “El ataque a los Clutter es el ataque al corazón de América no 
sólo geográfica sino también socialmente […] El tema que se subyace a toda la obra, pues, es el de la 
violación del paraíso por fuerzas externas y el cuestionamiento de las normas por las que se rige dicha 




irremediable collision between the two polarized Americas: “America, desperate, 
savage, violent America in collision with sane, safe, insular even smug America —
people who have every chance, against people who have none” (Capote, qtd. in González 
de la Aleja, 1990: 81). This “interpretative detour” (Doležel 1988: 477), by which the 
novel’s “fictional particulars” are taken as embodiments of “actual universals” (Doležel 
1988: 477), prevails as the major “empathy builder” in the novel’s thematic structure: by 
explaining his apparently amoral actions like an unescapable outcome and by turning 
him into the representative of a universal condition, Perry starts to be perceived as a 
victim, an individual who, as Ortells says “es el resultado de un determinismo social que 
lo condena irremisiblemente a un submundo de incomprensión, violencia y locura” 
(1999:82). Moreover, as this implicit universalist configuration also reveals that Mr. 
Clutter’s position as sovereign subject is possible at the expense of the bare life imposed 
on the homo sacer, it finally seems that the one ending with the lives of Mr. Clutter and 
his family is the discriminatory social order in which he actively participates, the same 
that is to kill Perry. Thus, in Foucault’s words, “[l]’homme qui vous donne la mort n’est 
pas libre de ne pas vous la donner. Le coupable, c’est la société, ou pour dire plus vrai 
c’est la mauvaise organisation sociale” (1975: 336). This apparent inversion of the binary 
opposition criminal-victim, that alters the readership’s appreciation of Perry as a 
negative character, could therefore lead to transform the “negative empathy” for him into 
empathy for a subject who is vulnerable in front of that “mauvaise organisation sociale”. 
The ensemble of dispositives enabling that organization, will be portrayed, precisely, in 
last section of In Cold Blood, “The Corner”, where the institutional apparatus of the 
Bourgeois Order will evaluate, diagnose, judge, and execute Dick and Perry. This last 
section will therefore depict the second “inevitable destiny” in the novel, that is, the 




structure, by which Perry murders the Clutters because of his social conditions and 
society murders him because of his crimes, is, as Ortells puts it, “una demostración de 
la circulación de la venganza” (1999:82): an “eye for an eye” that dissolves the puritan 
Manichean distinction between good and bad that regulates America in such a way that 
pure Evil is no longer recognizable.56  
“The Corner”, which narrates the criminals’ trial, incarceration, and execution, contains 
the clearest examples of Foucault’s theories on disciplinary power and its dispositives 
in In Cold Blood. In those final pages, Perry and Dick become the personification of 
Agamben’s homo sacer, in front of which the Bourgeois institutions and discourses are 
all-powerful. This uneven distribution of power, which appears as the thematic core of 
this section, is once again expressed and reinforced via its formal expression, as the zero 
focalization of an omniscient narration, that supplies explanations on the functioning of 
the penitentiary, judiciary, and psychiatric dispositives being portrayed, is combined 
with Perry’s focalization, which gives access to his thoughts and his diary entries and 
vindicates  the criminal’s protagonist role in the narration. Because of this dual 
perspective, although described in a detailed and documented manner, the trial is 
presented as an absurd and unfair process in which, as in other achievements in universal 
literature such as Kafka’s The Process or Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, the 
sentence seems to have been passed before the allegation, as the “popular jury” is 
selected according to their endorsement of capital punishment.57 This sense of injustice, 
that contributes to the creation of empathic engagement, will be once again textualized 
by the use of multi perspectivism, as it is explicitly denounced in a conversation 
                                                          
56 “Si bien el enfrentamiento entre el bien y el mal, tan característico de la literatura norteamericana como 
reflejo de la dualidad existente en el mundo, pervive tanto en sus primeras narraciones como en A Sangre 
Fría, las conclusiones a las que parece llegar en esta obra desmienten la tradicional división maniqueísta” 
(Ortells 2009: 32). 




between two journalists: 
“It’s unfair.” “What’s unfair?” “The whole trial. These guys don’t stand a chance.”  
“Fat chance they gave Nancy Clutter.” “Perry Smith. My God. He’s had such a 
rotten life—” Parr said, “Many a man can match sob stories with that little bastard. 
Me included. Maybe I drink too much, but I sure as hell never killed four people 
in cold blood.” “Yeah, and how about hanging the bastard? That’s pretty goddam 
cold-blooded too. (298, my emphasis) 
This dialogue is particularly relevant not only because of it being an instance of 
“intradiegetic empathy” and for acting like a manifesto against capital punishment, but 
because it reveals the double entendre behind the novel’s title: like Perry states, “he’s  
not the only killer in the courtroom” (280). As Foucault asserted, the bodies of the 
criminals are objectivized and “sont maintenant un bien social” (1975:129): as they 
embody the “abnormal” Other, Dick and Perry are the enemy of all the social body, 
which has the right to take “revenge”.58 Then, the criminals will be not only dispossessed 
of their right to freedom,59 but of their right to live, as the penalty imposed to them is 
death, requested by the jury “not in vengeance, but in all humbleness…” (Capote 1966: 
295). In this way, Perry and Dick become officially “human victims who may be killed 
but not sacrificed” (Agamben 1998: 53), deprived even of the control over their own 
existence, as Perry will be prevented in prison from committing suicide. Finally, after 
having been confined in their Death Row cells “almost two thousand days” (Capote 
1966: 329) that Perry describes “as though he existed ‘deep underwater’” (313), both are 
executed by hanging, a method that conforms with Mably’s principle, as it is “une 
                                                          
58 In Death Row, Dick says: “They [these people that write letters to the newspapers asking for death 
penalty]’re mad ’cause they’re not getting what they want—revenge” (Capote 1966: 328). 
59 Perry writes in his diary, “It is almost impossible for a man who enjoys freedom with all its prerogatives, 




exécution qui atteigne la vie plutôt que le corps” (Foucault 1975: 19).60 Perry, then, 
finally gets to the place his live has been taking him, but, importantly for the present 
analysis, before facing death, his last words of apology arise as a final plea for 
comprehension and empathy: “It would be meaningless to apologize for what I did. Even 
inappropriate. But I do. I apologize” (333). In contrast, Dick’s final words —“You 
people are sending me to a better world than this ever was” (331)— constitute a 
denunciation of an unequal social organization in which, as Perry writes in his diary, 
“the rich never hang. Only the poor and friendless” (249). 
The complete panoramic vision that the novel offers of the coldness and cruelty of the 
American legal system through its thematic structure, narrated, for the most part, from 
the point of view of its victim, Perry, functions as the novel’s final thematic “empathy 
builder”: the readership follows Perry in his plot trajectory and witnesses the 
dehumanization that the Bourgeois Order imposes on the Other. After having humanized 
Perry and explained his motives through several narratological devices, analyzed in the 
present MA thesis as “empathy builders”, the novel turns its attention to the Evil equally 
present in an excluding and polarized system,61 whose acts finally appear to the narratee 
to be as morally reprehensible and aleatory as the Clutter murders. This symbolic 
interpretation, that allows the novel to give a universal value to a particular case, turns 
In Cold Blood into a heterodox portrait of the American Dream and its society, which, 
as F.R. Karl considers, “was ready to define itself in terms of its murders and its ability 
to murder” (1983: 579). The merciless representation of America in Capote’s work 
seems to invite the readership to, on the one hand, “dwell on the social and ethical 
                                                          
60 In relation to that, the novel reproduces a conversation between two journalists who discuss the physical 
suffering of the criminals during the execution, that brings Mably’s principle to mind: “Uh-huh, but he 
don’t feel nothing. Wouldn’t be humane if he did.” “Well. And I suppose they feed them a lot of pills. 
Sedatives” (332). 
61 “We are now moved by the fate of the murderer rather than that of the murdered, and we condemn the 




problems present in the death of a murderer” (Pizer 1971: 118), and on the other, to 
interpret Perry’s crimes, symbolically, as an inevitable gesture, symptomatic of his 
environment, in which:  
matar y morir es el único gesto significativo que se le permite a esta gente sin 
palabra, excluidos desde siempre de todo discurso […] en esta obra ya no es el 
magistrado —el delegado del poder, el Mismo— quien habla en nombre de ese Otro 
terrible y lejano, sino que es el propio criminal, el Loco, quien toma la palabra. 
(Morey 2014: 302, my emphasis) 
All in all, by taking, as Morey’s quote says, the perspective of the Evil, the Other, 
Capote’s masterpiece invites its readership, through the “possible world” (Doležel) it 
constructs, to widen their ability to understand, offering a literary “safe” opportunity to 
liberate their empathic engagement from the “cultural distinctions, social norms and 
political practices of exclusion” (Pedwell 2014: 2) that limit it in everyday life. Despite 
its chronologic, stylistic, and thematic distance, this same ethical purpose can be found, 
as will be now explored, in the novel of a contemporary American-born author: Les 
bienveillantes, by Jonathan Littell.  
 
4.2. “LE VRAI DANGER POUR L’HUMANITÉ”: JONATHAN 
LITTELL’S LES BIENVEILLANTES 
 
Categorized within the innovative label of “perpetrator literature” (Bird 2019: 302), 
Jonathan Littell’s major work, Les bienveillantes (2006), consists of the fictional memoirs 
of a former SS officer, Maximilien “Max” Aue, who collaborated on the execution of the  
Endlösung der Judenfrage —"final solution to the Jewish question” —. Having been 




the most  important scenarios of Nazi Germany during the Second World War,62 Aue 
recounts his experiences during more than nine-hundred pages, which are divided into 
seven chapters named after different baroque dances, following the sequence of a Bach 
suite. This intersemiotic transposition (Aktulum 2017: 33), by which the narrative of each 
chapter is influenced by the rhythm of its correspondent dance, allows the reader to 
compartmentalize and tackle the otherwise overwhelming plot.  
In the first chapter, “Toccata”, that I will examine more in depth in the following section, 
the protagonist, Maximilien Aue, introduces himself as a middle-aged man and an ex-
nazi officer who has “tombé en bourgeoisie” (Littell 2006a: 19): he is currently running 
a lace factory somewhere in the north of France, and, despite his manifest homosexuality, 
is married to a woman “avec une certaine répugnance” and, “malhereusement” (Littell 
2006a:19), as he regrets, he is also the father of twins. In this prologue, chronologically 
placed sometime in the seventies, Aue also announces his intention to write his war 
memoirs down, not as a self-justifying gesture —"je n’ai rien a justifier” (12)— towards 
his readership,63 nor to be pardoned, but merely, as he insists, to entertain himself. Like 
the musical piece after which it is named, this section works as a prelude, is freer in its 
introspective style and enjoys a considerable independence from the rest of the work. 
Aue’s long analepsis starts in “Allemandes I et II”, where he depicts his experiences as a 
member of the Einsatzgruppen in the East Front, covering Ukraine, Crimea and the 
Caucasus, where his task was to report the mass murders of Jews and Bolsheviks. The 
allegro of the rapid succession of events at the beginning of this second chapter, 
“Allemande I”, contrasts with the posterior quiet moderato of the successive “Allemande 
                                                          
62 See David Gates, “The Monster in the Mirror”, The New York Times, March 5th 2009 or Laila Lalami, 
“The Kindly Ones by Jonathan Littell”, Los Angeles Times, March 15th 2009. 
63 “Si je me suis résolu à écrire, après tous ces années, c’est pour mettre les choses au point pour moi-même, 




II”, that corresponds to Aue’s stay in a balneary due to his continuous psychosomatic 
crises of vomit, fever and diarrhea. After his partial recovery, and as a punishment for his 
disagreement about a massacre and for the growing rumors about his homosexuality, he 
is sent to the Battle of Stalingrad in “Courante”. In this chapter, as fast and agile as the 
jumping dance that it evokes, Max is shot in the head, being saved and brought back to 
Germany by his loyal friend Thomas. In Berlin, he will spend a period of convalescence 
whose oneiric nature reflects the sinuosity of the chapter’s movement, “Sarabande”. After 
his recovery, Aue uses his military leave to go to Antibes to visit his mother and 
stepfather, with whom he has a conflictive relation. On arrival, he mysteriously discovers 
their corpses. Next, “Menuet (en rondeaux)” recounts, with a moderate and repetitive 
pace, the protagonist’s service at the Ministry of Interior of the Third Reich  in Berlin, 
where he strives to improve the productivity of the work camps in collaboration with 
personalities such as Himmler or Eichmann, a job that also leads him to visit the 
extermination camps in Poland. In this chapter, Weser and Clemens, two French 
policemen who start pursuing Max for being the main suspect of his mother’s murder, 
make their first appearance. As the composition that entitles it, the following chapter, 
“Air”, is a one-voice piece describing Max’s two weeks of solitude in his brother-in-law’s 
mansion in Pomerania, where he will engage in an autoerotic orgy, evade Weser and 
Clemens once again and be rescued from his confinement by Thomas, while, 
simultaneously, the Russian Army invades Germany. In the final chapter, “Gigue”, a 
name that evokes a fast and complex choreography with an unexpected ending, Thomas 
and Max arrive in Berlin to witness the city’s bombing, its siege, and the corresponding 
disbanding of the Third Reich. Finally, after having gotten rid of the two French 
inspectors harassing him with Thomas’ aid, Aue murders the latter to steal a false French 




As the referred-to synchronization between the baroque dances and the diegetical rythm 
advances, Les bienveillantes stands as a highly technical narrative exercice whose 
formality remains inseparable from the general thematic and ethical sense of the novel. 
Many of the stylistic tools deployed in the narration are oriented, as has been mentioned, 
towards familiarizing the readership with the novel’s protagonist, Max Aue, towards 
whom the “stream of empathy” of the text is directed. However, as will be addressed 
during this analysis, this conflicting affective investment, that “puts both author and 
reader on uncomfortable ethical ground, and on uncomfortable aesthetic ground as well” 
(Suleiman 2009: 2), leaves space for a “critical distance” (Gadamer) that, as Meretoja  
argues, “allows the reader to engage emotionally with an ethically problematic lifeworld 
without uncritically adopting the protagonist’s perspective” (2016: 371).  
 
4.2.1. VOICE: “JE VOUS DIS QUE JE SUIS COMME VOUS”  
 
Within the ensemble of “empathy builders” that Little’s artwork congregates, those 
concerning the narrative “voice” stand out because of their explicitness and affective 
strength. Following Genette’s terminology anew, the single voice in Les bienveillantes 
can be clearly classified as, on the one hand, “homodiegetic”, as Max is “a character in 
the story he tells” (Genette 1980: 245); and, on the other hand, “intradiegetic”, because 
the former SS-agent “tells his own story” (Genette 1980: 248). In this “homodiegetic-
intradiegetic paradigm” (Genette 1980: 248), the textual “voice” appears as an 
archetypical instance of the first-person self-narration that, as has been previously 
remarked in this MA thesis, is recognized by narrative theorists as the most obvious 
literary device “supporting character identification and contributing to empathic 




automatic call to empathy” (Suleiman, 2009: 2) is boosted in the text mainly through two 
moral demands made by Aue to his readership: the recognition of the humanity he has in 
common with them and the acceptance of their role as confidants. These two premises, 
that the narrator regards as necessary requirements to pursue the reading,64 are already 
laid bare in the prelude, which, as Sanyal indicates, functions as a “reading contract” 
(2010: 48) and, I would add, as a veiled request for empathy. Consequently, in order to 
tackle the “empathy builders” concerning narrative “voice” in Les bienveillantes, I will 
be focusing on this revelatory first chapter of the novel in the following pages. 
As Sanyal brilliantly argues (2010: 30), it seems no accident that this inaugural section is 
entitled “Toccata”, as Aue’s voice, situated now in the extradiegetic first narrative,65 
adopts an overt conative function (Jakobson) to “touch” the reader. This direct 
interpellation appears indeed in the novel’s first line: “[…] laissez-moi vous raconter 
comment ça s’est passé” (11), a petition that he justifies alleging that his story concerns 
the reader directly: “vous verrez bien que ça vous concerne” (11). Therefore, Maximilien 
conceives his memoires as a “conte moral” (11), a lesson on humanity that should be 
known by all of his fellows “frères humains” (11) because, as he warns the reader, “vous 
avez peut-être eu plus de la chance que moi, mais vous n’êtes pas meilleur” (26-27). 
Through this equalizing movement, Aue locates himself within the “hommes ordinaires 
dont est constitué l’État” (27) and so, he justifies his actions by contextualizing them in 
the historical frame it was his fate to live. This will constitute one of his on-going 
strategies as an immoral first-person narrator: to assert that “he and the Nazis were not 
outside ‘the human’ but within it” (Suleiman 2009: 4). The initial denial of the reader’s 
                                                          
64 “Et si vous n’en êtes pas convaincu, inutile de lire plus loin. Vous ne comprendrez rein et vous vous 
fâcherez, sans profit pour vous ni pour moi” (Littell 2006a: 28). 
65 According to Genette’s description of narrative levels, “Toccata” is situated in the time of the “narrative 
act” (1980: 227), corresponding to the extradiegetical “first narrative”, while the rest of the novel, the 
narrator’s memories, would constitute the diegesis stemming from this first narrative, therefore a 




position of moral superiority,66 that will be constantly reiterated during the narration,67 
reveals itself as an obvious and paramount “empathy builder” if we take into 
consideration that, as Oatley puts it, “the sense of a shared humanity”, so troublesome to 
assume in the case of a perpetrator of mass murder, lays the foundation for identification 
with fictional characters (2016: 623). This captatio benevolentiae, which has been 
compared with Baudelaire’s famous incipit «Hypocrite lecteur/mon semblable/mon 
frère!»,68 will also serve, as I will develop lately, as the ground for the final moral of 
Aue’s testimony: “le vrai danger pour l’homme c’est moi, c’est vous” (27-28). All in all, 
it constitutes the base for this introductory “touching” of the narratee’s sympathy, this 
invitation à la lecture whose ending claims once again: “je suis un homme comme les 
autres, je suis un homme comme vous. Allons, puisque je vous dis que je suis comme 
vous !” (30).  
Having openly presented his readership with this binding contract as the starting point of 
their parasocial relationship (Oatley), the narrator makes another request of his “kindred 
reader” (Sanyal 2010: 48): if “voice” is, like Benveniste theorized, “the subjectivity of 
language” (cit. in Genette 213), Aue’s narratee must accept to be the repository of his 
conflictive subjectivity. Thus, the “voice” in Littell’s novel, with a transparent honesty, 
takes the intimacy inherent to the intradiegetic narration to an extreme by involving its 
receiver not only in his war memories, but also, as he warns in the prelude,69 in his more 
personal experiences and thoughts. This second “empathy builder” inside the narrative 
category of “voice”, which seeks to increment the reader’s complicity, is already 
                                                          
66 Littell himself specified in an interview with La Libre Belgique that his decision to approach perpetrator’s 
literature from Nazism was motivated by a desire to “ancrer ce récit chez des gens comme nous pour 
empêcher le lecteur de prendre de la distance” (Jonathan Litell 2006b: entretien avec Guy Duplat). 
67 “On a beaucoup parlé, après la guerre, pour essayer d’expliquer ce qui s’était passé, de l’inhumain. Mais 
l’inhumain, excusez-moi, cela n’existe pas. Il n’y a que de l’humain et encore de l’humain” (543). 
68 See Ercolino 2018: 253, Meretoja 2016: 385 or Koppenfels 2012:142. 
69 “Je ne regrette rien : j’ai fait mon travail, voilà tout ; quant à mes histoires de famille, que je raconterai 




exploited in “Toccata”, in which the narrator-character confides some of his deepest 
secrets to his now “equal” confidant, as his hatred for his mother (28), the existence of a 
life-long “interdit” (29) love, his desire to have been born a woman (29) or his 
homosexuality (19). From this collection of taboos, that will become thematic leitmotifs 
in Aue’s sustained introspection, S. Roussel (2010) highlights the last one as the main 
promotor of the complicity between character and reader. Being a participant in an 
ideology as homophobic as Nazism, Max’s sexuality, if discovered, would signify an 
immediate death sentence, a Sword of Damocles that swings during the whole narration 
and whose menace motivates the reader to suffer with the protagonist and empathize with 
him, at least, in this respect. As a result, as Roussel concludes, the most personal side of 
the testimony, unknown to every character but not to the reader, adds a humanizing factor 
to the narrator and grants the receiver’s partial solidarity, because “le récit fonctionne 
ainsi sur la détention et la préservation du secret […] et les lecteurs sont dans la 
confidence” (156). 
Even if we are told Max will pour his heart out during the following one thousand pages, 
and he certainly does by revealing the events of his traumatic childhood and his horrifying 
acts as an Einsatzgruppen officer, the narrator assures us that he does not want his sins to 
be expiated with the reader’s pardon. Like he himself claims in the first page, “ne pensez 
pas que je cherche à vous convaincre de quoi que ce soit” (11). Despite his reiterations 
that “c’est n’est pas de culpabilité, de remords qu’il s’agit ici” (15), the general self-
justifying tone of this introduction —generated through his own constant contradictions,70 
his comparisons of the Shoah with other historical massacres (21) and, overall, the already 
                                                          
70 “Si j’ai enfin décidé de d’écrire, c’est bien […] pour éclaircir un ou deux points obscurs, pour vous peut-




mentioned assertion of his humanity71 and of his inevitable subordination to his 
circumstances72— clearly say the opposite. Then, as Delorme puts it, “[o]r, en dépit du 
discours que tient le narrateur-écrivain au début du roman, la culpabilité sous-jacente aux 
confessions du personnage tisse un impossible projet : écrire pour réparer la perte” (2010 : 
45). In this sense, Aue’s façade of cynicism cracks slightly in “Toccata”,73 as it will 
repeatedly do during his following testimony, to reveal a repressed sense of guilt that does 
not go unnoticed by the narratee, who becomes conscious of a suffering so deep that, as 
the narrator beautifully illustrates, “si jamais vous arriviez à me faire pleurer, mes larmes 
vous vitrioleraient le visage” (23). These inconsistencies in the narrative “voice” that, as 
Ercolino also indicates,74 conceal an unconscious request for empathic understanding, 
become the third “voice”-related “empathy builder”, as they may provoke compassion 
towards the confused narrator, who is apparently uncapable of dealing with his own 
memories.75 Besides, these early impasses between what Max says and what the text 
leaves implicit anticipate the last particularity of the novel’s “voice”, to wit, Max Aue’s 
progressively becoming an “unreliable narrator” (Genette 1980: 188).  
In this way, as is anticipated in “Toccata”, the intimate sincerity that underpins the 
“voice” of the I-narrator during the first half of the novel will progressively decay 
thenceforwards, corrupted by the protagonist’s lacunae. This unreliability threatens both 
the complicity that has been established as the main “mode of narration” and the resulting 
                                                          
71 As Ercolino states, “[m]ost disturbingly, Aue repeatedly tries to cancel the supposed human and moral 
distance between himself and the reader, indirectly arguing against the alleged historical singularity 
constituted by Nazism” (253). 
72“Comme la plupart, je n’ai jamais demandé à devenir un assassin. […] Qui, de sa propre volonté, à part 
un fou, aurait choisit le meurtre ?” (28). 
73 “les remords […] cela aussi existe, sans doute, je ne veux pas le nier” (15). 
74 “However, despite his statements, what Aue actually does, particularly in the first section of the novel, 
‘Toccata’, looks like a sly self-apology” (252). 
75 With regard to Aue’s incapacity to bear his past, Meretoja specifies that, for the ex-nazi, “[t]he process 
of narrating is an attempt to confront and tame aspects of himself –and of humanity– that resist taming, like 





“strategy of reading that this mode requires” (Sanyal 2010: 47), which was based on trust 
and understanding and constituted a basic “empathy builder” within the novel. Critics as 
H. Meretoja (2016) or Y. Ferdjani (2010) have related this change in the “voice’s 
reliability to the gunshot wound that Max receives during the battle of Stalingrad, arguing 
that “the wound in Aue’s head marks a turning point in the narration: afterwards, the sense 
of narrative mastery increasingly begins to break down” (Meretoja 2016: 394). In effect, 
after his oneiric period of convalescence, between “Courante” and “Sarabande”, Max’s 
capacity to interpret his own past decreases dramatically, affecting especially his family-
related memories. Hence, for instance, in “Sarabande”, Aue visits his mother in the south 
of France and he makes the acquaintance of two teenage twins (477), who have been 
raised in the family house and whose origin is unknown to the narrator. The following 
day, after a heated argument with his mother, Max discovers hers and her husband’s 
corpses and abandons the scene of the crime with “une envie panique de fuir” (Littell 
2006a: 488). Even if, as the literary critique has stressed,76 every evidence incriminates 
Aue not only as guilty of matricide and murder but also as the father of the twins, who 
would be the result of his incestuous relations with his own twin sister,77 Aue will claim 
to ignore who was the murderer of the couple and who are the parents of the twins. 
Therefore, he will defend his innocence and his lack of awareness of the truth during the 
whole novel, regardless of Weser and Clemens’s incriminating proofs and the reader’s 
certainty of his culpability. Thus, the narrator’s unreliability78—a postmodern trait within 
a generally realistic narrative “voice”— transforms the character-narrator into, in F. 
                                                          
76 See Delorme (2010: 42) or Roussel (2010: 161). 
77 “In his personal history, Aue represses the evidence of his murder and matricide, but also of his incest, 
since the mysterious twins are probably the outcome of his relations with his sister Una” (Sanyal 2010: 55). 
78 In fact, the narrator’s confusion will do nothing but degenerate in the section “Air”, described by Ercolino 
as “a powerful textual generator of empathic distress” (254). Aue’s confusion between reality and 
imagination is admitted by himself when he argues: “Voilà ce don’t je me souvenais, or il semble que les 




Holmes’s words, “the text’s first and worst reader” (2015: 232), consequently turning the 
reader into a better interpreter of the story than the protagonist himself. This hermeneutic 
imbalance, which translates into dramatic irony, has two main effects on the empathic 
perception of the fictional character: on the one hand, it adds realism to the narration and, 
on the other, it transmits the protagonist’s distress, “that seems to know no bounds” 
(Ercolino 2018: 254). At first, Aue’s increasing uncertainties do not undermine the trust 
on which the parasocial relation has been built and that has been maintained and 
reinforced during more than four hundred pages.79 Far from eroding this bond, 
narratologists have claimed that the contradictions in the diegesis often give naturality to 
the narrative “voice”.80 Certainly, in Les bienveillantes, this formal aspect seems to 
humanize the protagonist, as it confirms the referred-to suspicion of his repression of the 
memories that, as he puts it, asphyxiate him like a mountain of stones upon his chest 
(Littell 2006a: 13). The reader’s position of dramatic irony, that opens in this distance 
between what is said and what is understood, is highly significant for empathic reception, 
as it allows the reader to perceive Max’s feelings of guilt and shame of which he himself 
is unaware. These instances of veiled meaning in the novel, which are detached from the 
perception of the narrator himself, will do nothing but multiply through the modal 
structure of the testimony, that is characterized by the employ of paralepses (Genette) and 
by the perspective distance given by Aue’s “particular status as a perpetrator-witness” 
(Razinsky 2008: 15).  
                                                          
79 In this sense, the novel’s extension can be highlighted as another motivation for empathic attachment, an 
additional “empathic building” strategy already remarked by Ercolino, who claims that “the length of the 
exposure to Aue contributes to the creation of an empathic bond between him and the reader that, from the 
very beginning of the narrative, is forged by negativity and distress” (253). 
80 “This lack of certainty may be attributed to a postmodern formulation, but also, and most importantly, to 




4.2.2. MOOD: MONO-PERSPECTIVISM AND THE REJECTION OF THE 
LÉVINASIAN “FACE” 
 
At first sight, the diegetic “mood” that Littell’s novel puts into practice presents no 
apparent difficulties. It reunites the traditional characteristics of mono-perspectivism that 
usually accompanies an intradiegetical narration, even if, in the present case, this is 
complicated by the ideological bias of the focalizer. In general terms, the diegesis is 
narrated from the point of view of the character-narrator (adult Max Aue) and focalized, 
exclusively, by the character-protagonist (younger Max Aue). As a result, the focalization 
is internal (Gennette), because “the narrative is focused through the consciousness of a 
character” (Culler 1980: 11) and constantly fixed, as the subject of this internal 
focalization does not change during the whole story (Gennette 1980: 189). As a result, in 
P. Tame’s words, Max guides us through his memories of Nazi Germany, “comme un 
Dante démoniaque dans cet enfer guerrier” (2010: 214). Yet, I would say, to be more 
precise but still in line with Tame’s adequate literary comparaison, that Aue is more a 
Virigil than a Dante: he plays the role of the readership’s guide and is the unique source 
of information on the hell-like panorama that he depicts. Taking into account this 
continual unilaterality, this section will examine the novel’s mono-perspectivism as one 
of the technical aspects that generate negative empathy in the text. The “mood”’s mono-
perspectivism would be then a main “empathy builder” because, as Ercolino suggests, 
having the former SS-officer as their only reference, the readership is partially 
“entrapped” in his personal perceptions: “Throughout the narration, pages-long 
paragraphs and periods, the articulated hypotactic structure of sentences, and the 
narrative’s confessional register itself create a sense of never-ending entrapment; an 
entrapment in the turbid flow of Aue’s obsessions, […] an entrapment in the endlessly 




that Aue’s focalization encompasses, the zoom of the focus through which those dramatic 
events are reviewed and, most importantly, the attitude and moral considerations that 
accompany Max’s point of view are essential constructors not only of the plot, but also 
of the reader’s affective perception of the protagonist.  
In general terms, Max’s focalization, or his presentation of the narrative information 
(Genette 1980: 162), stands out for its precision and its meticulous realism. As most 
critics admit,81 in what concerns his experiences as a member of the Third Reich, the 
protagonist of Les bienveillantes constitutes a “reliable historical witness”, as he 
possesses “the intelligence and analytic ability, the emotional detachment and temporal 
distance” (Suleiman 2009: 5) necessary for a clear review of the historical events. In 
relation to this, L. Razinsky point out how Aue’s job within the Nazi machinery —to 
gather information and to write reports— coincides perfectly with his function within the 
text, which is equally “[…] that of an eye. He sees. He is more often a conduit of 
information than active participant […] Aue functions, then, not only as a witness, but 
almost as in situ annalist” (2008: 71-72). Despite the passivity of the narrator, mentioned 
by Razinsky, and the general detached tone of his témoignage, Max position as an 
observer, as he himself recalls, does not transform him into a neutral reporter of the 
Holocaust:82 he remains a perpetrator, an immoral condition that determines, irrevocably, 
his point of view, as it collides with the reader’s sense of moral decency. Here lays, 
accordingly, the most problematic aspect of the novel’s narrative “mood”.  
The ideological dilemma that this perspective poses can be easily conceptualized if, as H. 
Meretoja proposes, it is addressed through Gadamer’s hermeneutic concepts of “horizon” 
                                                          
81 Razinsky: “[…] exact in his minute details, wide-ranging in his coverage of the war almost from 
beginning to end, precise in his use of specific dates and reference to real events, Littell is, in a way, really 
writing history” (2008: 71) and Ferdjani “Heureusement, d’autres critiques ont remarqué que Aue est 
comme un filtre à travers lequel on peut observer la barbarie. […] Ce n’est pas tant un personnage, qu’une 
voix, un ton, un regard” (2010 : 264), among others.  




and “application”. From Gadamer’s point of view, the “horizon” of a character, meaning 
“the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage 
point” (Gadamer, qtd. in Deciu 67), emerges directly from the character’s focalization. 
When reading a fictional work, the “horizon” imposed by the novel encounters the 
reader’s own vision of affairs —or “horizon”— in the moment of reception, which 
Gadamer calls the “fusion of horizons” or Horizontverschmelzung (Gadamer 1997: 302). 
To resolve this distance between the narratee’s and the narrator’s “horizons”—that, in the 
case of Les bienveillantes, is assumed to be a considerable one—, the readership is forced, 
according to Gadamer, to engage in an “application”, that is to say, in an adjustment of 
their frame of reference and temporal range to those pertaining to the perspective of the 
fictive other (Deciu 2016: 68). Despite all of this, as has been previously exposed in this 
MA thesis, the process of “application”, like that of developing empathy, is dialectical, 
because, as Meretoja also underlines, “the ability to perceive the world from the 
perspective of the other does not mean letting go of one’s own values” (2016: 388). This 
last point is essential for the creation of “negative empathy” in Les bienveillantes, as it 
helps in facing the unethical nature of the narrator’s focus by making it possible to, 
simultaneously, “imagine an ethically problematic life-world and to retain a critical 
distance from this world” (Meretoja 2016: 388). Nevertheless, as will be now exposed, 
the protagonist’s “horizon” as a criminal is not monolithically immoral, as said 
immorality is constantly problematized, bringing a shade of grey to his point of view, 
whose fissures permit the stream of empathy to filter in. In this sense, two specific uses 
of the novel’s focalization, which dissent from Max’s otherwise constant “emotional 
detachment” (Suleiman), will be addressed here, argue that they collaborate in converting 
Aue’s monoperpectivism into one of the major “empathy builders” in Les bienveillantes: 




Gathered in the second chapter, “Allemandes I et II”, when Max is in charge of 
documenting the Nazi’s procedures in Ukraine and the Caucasus, the Aktions perpetrated 
against Jews and Bolsheviks constitute the most stunning events narrated from the point 
of view of a perpetrator. Even though his activity is that of an informer, the protagonist 
assists regularly to the killings, but, as he confesses only to his readership, they disgust 
him: “j’ai des doutes sur nos méthodes, je le puis en toute sincerité: j’en saississais mal 
la logique” (81). As this quote displays, he justifies this secret disapproval, though, 
through cold economic and logical reasoning: the murder of thousands appears to him as 
“un gâchis humain” that causes him “une rage immense, démesurée” (126) that he 
interprets, apparently, as a reaction to the loss of possible workers for the Third Reich. 
Despite his “early revulsion for acts of war-time slaughter” (Lyle 2008: 85), he complies 
with the Führer’s orders, apparently, without further hesitation, considering the 
Endlösung “inévitable et nécessaire” (81). This apathy is mirrored in “le regard froid de 
l’objectif” (De Tholozany 2010: 201) through which Aue narrates the first massacres, 
described with an objective and informative style. Like Razinsky points out, however, 
Aue’s blindness to the victims is usually complicated by the focalization itself: “While 
most of the narration is conveyed from an indifferent perspective vis-à-vis the victim’s 
individuality, on a few occasions, in the case of a few ‘chosen’ victims, Aue actually sees 
a human in front of him” (2008: 79). It could be said, therefore, that amid the Bosch-like 
detailed panoramic of hell that Max provides, his point of view sometimes zooms in on a 
specific victim, who, in an immediate symbolic gesture becomes, in Lévinasian terms, 
the “face of the Other” (Lévinas 2011: 87), and as a result, the “naked face” (Peperzak 
1993: 83) of all the condemned. 
In those instances, the novel’s protagonist demonstrates a “certain moral sensibility” 




1993:83) that, for some critics, approaches sympathy (Delorme 2010: 39) or even 
empathy (Razinsky, 80). Examples of such morally revealing encounters concentrate in 
the first half of the novel, being the most prominent ones Aue’s friendship with the pianist 
Jew child, Yakov (104), who is finally murdered after having lost his hand in a working 
accident and to whom the anti-hero is “un peu attaché” (109); his concern for the little 
girl who looks for her mother in the mass graves (107), and that he reluctantly gives to a 
SS-soldier to be executed;83 or the hanging of the partisan girl, whose “regard clair et 
lumineux” makes Max “éclater en flames” (171). Nevertheless, the clearest interpellation 
for “responsibility” (Lévinas 2011: 87) made by “the Face” in the novel is personified in 
a dying young girl, whom Aue individualizes and on whom he takes pity for a moment: 
[…] mon regard croisa celui d'une belle jeune fille, presque nue mais très élégante, 
calme, ses yeux emplis d'une immense tristesse […] je voulais de tout mon coeur 
me pencher et lui essuyer la terre et la sueur mêlées sur son front, lui caresser la 
joue et lui dire que ça allait, que tout irait pour le mieux mais à la place je lui tirai 
convulsivement une balle dans la tête. (126) 
As this last example clearly illustrates, Aue finally ignores what is, for Lévinas, the first 
implication of the acknowledgement of “the Face”: namely, the order “thou shalt not kill” 
(Lévinas 2011: 89). However, this ethical irresponsiveness to the encounter with the 
Lévinasian Other, as Razinsky notes, “is far from mere indifference” (2008: 79) because, 
as is usual in the narration, Aue’s behavior and musings contradict his ideological 
reasoning in order to “testify his ethical involvement” (Razinsky, 2008: 79) and 
preoccupation for the suffering of Others. In general terms, and despite his not answering 
“the call” (Lévinas 2011: 89), Max does not forget the responsibility that the Face entails: 
after having left the lost little girl, he reports feeling “le vertige, je voulais pleurer […] je 
                                                          




ressentais une collère folle” (107), he runs to the woods to cry, a place that now “me 
faisait peur” (108) for being the space where the massacres are executed. This copying 
mechanism that he comes up with is repeated after finishing the young girl off, when he 
hides among the trees, again, to cry (126). Also, when the partitures that he wanted to 
give to Yakov as a present arrive after the boy’s murder, he experiences “une grande 
mélancolie” (141) and, two years after the execution of the partisan girl, he recalls her, 
sobbing, “ravagé par son souvenir, ma Notre-Dame-des-Nieges” (835). Right after, he 
adds: “ce n’était pas des remords, je n’avais pas des remords […] seulement je comprenais 
ce que cela voulait dire de pendre une fille”  (835). In spite of his manifested lack of 
remorse, these emotional reactions to his war experiences appear to the readership, from 
their position of dramatic irony, as obvious manifestations of a repressed sense of guilt 
and of an existential suffering. In fact, what has been previously called in this MA thesis 
“dramatic irony” acquires, from the perspective of the narrative “mood”, the category of 
what Genette labels “paralepsis”, which refers to when the focalization gives less 
information about the transcendence of the events than what the readership can infer 
(Genette 1980: 199). The “paralepses” of the novel would hide, in this case, the 
protagonist’s tribulation, essential for a sympathetic response to him because, as Ercolino 
notes, “the men’s suffering invites empathy, and their gradual self-castigating 
introspection and awareness of their own culpability emphasizes their humanity and 
potential for moral salvation” (2018: 305).  As Razinsky explains, through these moments 
of revelation and weakness, and also through his more general reflections on the Jews’ 
tragic destiny,84 Max is “unconsciously” giving testimony for the lives of the victims […] 
bringing their lives out of the dark” (2008: 81). Probably as a consequence of the tendency 
                                                          
84 “Qui me demandais-je, pleurera tous ces Juifs tués, tous ces enfants juifs enterrés les yeux ouverts sous 
la riche terre noire de l’Ukraine, si on tue aussi leurs sœurs et leurs mères ? Si on les tuait tous, il ne resterait 




of the narratee to feel “compassion for the suffering hero” (Jauss, qtd. in Ercolino 2018: 
248), these contradictions in the focalization trigger in the readership, on the one hand, 
negative empathy for the protagonist , and, on the other, a desire to witness his 
redemption, to see him repenting and transforming his latent bad consciousness into an 
active response. This expected reaction, of course, never takes place in Les bienveillantes 
which comes as a frustration for the receiver, who experiments then the “non-cathartic” 
(Ngai) dimension of negative empathy, qualified by Ercolino as a “regressive aesthetic 
experience” (2018: 244). According to the theorist, in Littell’s novel, this literary effect 
“rests on the peculiar feeling of permanent shock caused by reading” (254, emphasis in 
the original), which is transmitted, in my opinion, by means of the novel’s partial 
recurrence to excess and transgression (Razinsky 2008: 82). In the diegesis, this stylistic 
trait is patent not only in the “atrocity exhibition” (Razinsky 2008: 82) of the mass 
murders, but also in the eschatological focalization on Aue’s medical symptoms: vomits, 
diarrhea85 and anxiety attacks.86 These maladies, as the reception of the novel has agreed 
on,87 seem to be psychosomatic and therefore, would constitute another confirmation of 
the protagonist’s veiled distress for the victims. Even if his health problems start at the 
same time as his testimony of the executions, normally occurring right after them,88 and 
are said to continue in his old age,89 Max is, once again, unable to relate these physical 
reactions to his moral guilt. Nonetheless, he manages to establish this connection when it 
                                                          
85 “Je n’avais vomi qu’une seule fois ou deux, mais, régulièrement, après le repas, j’étais pris de ces haut-
le- coeur degréables et fatigants” (137); “Je vomissais souvent maintenant et sentais que je tombais un peu 
malade,j’avais de la fièvre, pas assez pour me retenir au lit, mais plutôt de longs frisons et une sensation de 
fragilité, comme si ma peau devenait de cristal” (168). 
86 “la nuit, je ne dormais pas […] J’avais la vertigen, je voulais pleurer” (106) ; “ De nouveau, une immense 
envie de pleurer me submergeait. Cela me prenait souvent maintenant” (358).  
87 See Sanyal (2010: 54) or Ercolino (2018: 254). 
88 “j’imaginais ces garçons proprets ou ces jeunes filles au charme discret sous le gaz, pensées qui me 
soulevaient le cœur […] et pour la première fois depuis longtemps j’avais envie de vomir, vomir mon 
impuissance, ma tristesse, et ma vie inutile” (724). 
89 In “Toccata”, Aue interrupts his diegesis to explain: “Une breve pause pour aller vomir, et je reprends. 
C’est une autre de mes nombreuses petites afflictions […] C’est un vieux problème, ça date de la guerre, 





comes to the symptomatology of his fellow SS-officers: “leurs réactions, leur violence, 
leur alcoolisme, les dépressions nerveuses, les suicides […] tout cela démontrait que 
l’autre existe, existe en tant qu’autre, en tant qu’humain” (142, emphasis in the original). 
In fact, as will be now explored, Max’s internal point of view when dealing with the 
characterization of the other Nazi perpetrators is highly important for the humanization 
of his dramatis persona, as in those portrayals, the mono-perspectivism directs the 
“stream of empathy” towards Max himself.  
On the one hand, the description of the brutal actions committed by his comrades gives 
room for the reader to establish a comparison between them and the narrator, a 
comparison that is favorable to the latter. On the other hand, because of the analytical 
perspective from which the Nazi procedures are recounted and his subsequent opinions 
on them, Max seems to distance himself from the national-socialist system. Thus, during 
the course of his career as an SS-officer in the East Front, Stalingrad and Berlin, Max 
observes his peers —whether officers, soldiers and bureaucrats— closely, in order to 
report they behavior and to categorize them in accordance with their nature: 
 Je pouvais maintenant distinguer trois tempéraments parmi mes collègues […] des 
criminels, qui s’avaient découvert grâce à la guerre. Puis il y avait ceux que cela 
dégoûtait et qui tuaient par devoir, en surmontant leur répugnance, par amour de 
l’ordre. Enfin, il y avait ceux qui considéraient les Juifs comme des bêtes et les 
tuaient comme un boucher égorge une vache […] Et moi, alors ? Moi, je ne 
m’identifiais à aucun de ceux trois types. (105-106, my emphasis) 
As we can see in the quote above, Aue detaches himself from his equals,90 and considers 
himself, like P. Tame notes, “un marginal. Ce n’est pas un fasciste orthodoxe. C’est 
                                                          
90 In relation to this, the protagonist even grows afraid of following the same path as “the others”. In 
Stalingrad after having met a remarkably dehumanized young officer, he wonders: “Dans combien de 




d’ailleurs ce qui nous intéresse chez lui. Il incarne ‘le héros problématique’, type héroïque 
de Georg Lukács, en lutte avec lui-même et avec la société” (2010: 219). Effectively, 
Max will continuously manifest his disapproval of the “antisémites viscéraux, obscènes” 
(227), not only by sharing that opinion with the reader —“tuer sans comprendre pourquoi 
et sans souci non plus […] Voilà ce que je ne comprenais pas” (89)— but also by 
confronting the abusers directly, for instance, when one of them kills a  newborn (149), or 
tortures a prisoner without reason.91 Aue’s dissidences from the ideology of the Third 
Reich, in which he started to participate actively by chance only in order to avoid a 
condemnation for homosexuality (74), increase in number during the narration.92 Besides, 
they are accompanied by a growing apathy on the part of the narrator,93 who becomes 
familiarized with this “horror piled upon horror” (Arendt 1963: 8), a moral decay of which 
he blames the Nazi regime: “Voilà ce qu’ils ont fait de moi, me disais-je, un homme qui 
ne peut voir une forêt sans songer à une fosse commune” (Littell 645, my emphasis). This 
passive distance is moreover broadened by the chronological distance between the I-
narrator and the I-protagonist, that allows the first to introduce historical references 
extracted from his posterior readings on the Holocaust.94 All these apparently impartial 
analysis of Nazi Germany —concerning the officers, the methodology and the posterior 
                                                          
91 “Je rejoignis Turek en deux enjambées et le saisis rudement par le bras : ‘Vous êtes devenu fou ! Cessez 
cela tout de suite’” (229). 
92 In “Sarabande”, Aue hesitates about his commitment to Nazism in the following terms: “Un homme de 
convictions? Autrefois, sans doute, j’en avais été un, mais maintenant, où se tenait-elle, la clarté de mes 
convictions ? […] si je tentais d’en saisir une, elle me filait entre les doigts, comme une anguille nerveuse 
et musclée” (439). 
93 Already in Berlin, he asks himself when did he stop being affected by horror: “En Ukraine ou au Caucase, 
des questions de cet ordre me concernaient encore, je m’affligeais de difficultés et en discutais avec sérieux, 
avec le sentiment qu’il s’agissait là de problèmes vitaux. Mais ce sentiment semblait s’être perdu. Où cela, 
à quel moment ? À Stalingrad ? […] le sentiment qui me dominait à présent était une vaste indifférence” 
(525). 
94 For instance, the narrator demonstrates his posterior reading of the records of the Nuremberg trials and 
of Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, when, dealing with the figure of this bureaucrat, he explains: 
“Si j’ai décrit si longuement ces rencontres avec Eichmann, ce n’est pas que je m’en souvienne mieux que 
d’autres: mais ce petit Oberstrumbannführer, entre-temps, est devenu une sorte de célébrité [...] ce n’étais 
certainement pas l’ennemi du genre humain qu’on a décrit à Nuremberg [...] il n’était non plus une 




literature on the subject— give to the focalization of the protagonist the qualities of that 
of a witness, a particularity of the “mood” that Razinsky (2008) also noticed: “This 
structure of simultaneous belonging and distance, so that Aue is at once wholly within 
the Nazi system and sufficiently outside it to see it for what it is, both historically and 
morally, is what defines his particular status as a perpetrator-witness” (15). On the whole, 
this ambiguous double-face nature in the novel’s mono-perspectivism would make it 
easier for the narratee to, as Suleiman says, make “empathy for a perpetrator of genocide” 
coexist “with revulsion and moral condemnation” (2009: 2), as the protagonist himself 
tries to strike a balance between indignation and passivity. Finally, Max’s intermediate 
moral position is partially resolved when, in “Menuet (en rondeaux)”, he offers himself 
to investigate on the improvement of the life conditions in the concentration camps. Like 
Suleiman observes, “[t]his twist allows Littell to show Aue as being appalled and 
indignant at the treatment of the prisoners […] without abandoning his Nazi allegiance” 
(2009: 11). Like his engineer friend Osnabrugge,95 from thenceforth, Aue will focus on 
constructing instead of on destroying, even if, unlike the former, he considers his present 
role as a perpetrator the logical outcome of a life-long tendency “à la radicalité” (95): a 
connection between his war experiences and his traumatic past that is inspected in the 
novel through the use of the narrative “tense”. 
 
4.2.3. TENSE : “LA PASSION POUR L’ABSOLU” 
As has already been mentioned, Les bienveillantes presents a clear temporal distance 
between “the time of the narrating”, to wit older Max writing his memories; and “the time 
of the story” (Genette 1980: 29), meaning the intradiegetic events in which a younger 
                                                          
95 The bridge engineer confesses to Aue : “Même quand j’étais petit, j’aimais construire, alors que tous 




Max was involved.96 This narratological structure, which affects the extradiegetic time of 
the narrative, seems to imitate that of oral literature, in which a character explains his past 
to an audience, is constantly made explicit during the “time of the story” through what 
Genette called “metalepses”, that is to say, “the transition from one narrative level to 
another” (1980: 234). The incursions of the character-narrator in the diegesis, as I have 
pointed out in the previous sections, accomplish different tasks —from providing 
historical insights to manifesting his own unreliability97— but sometimes they simply 
fulfill the fatic function (Jakobson) of activating the communication between narrator and 
narratee. These interventions remind the latter of the presence of the “voice” in the 
present-time first narrative and give realism to the memoirs. The motivation of the 
metalepses, in which the narrator provides “addresses to the reader” (Genette 1980: 234) 
is, for instance, to recall their reading contract — “Je ne racontai pas tout cela à Partenau: 
mais à vous, je le raconte” (190)— to provide a reminder of the reader’s freedom to 
terminate that contract —“vous disposez d’un pouvoir sans appel, celui de fermer ce livre 
et de le jeter à la poubelle” (720)— or even a warning —“Vous devez penser: ah, cette 
histoire est enfin finie. Mais non, elle continue encore” (837). Through these metaliterary 
comments, the text reasserts the intimacy of the narrating space, prompting an emotional 
engagement, but also displays the influence of the oral tradition of storytelling, in which 
such interpellations are common. Having defined itself as a “veritable conte moral” 
already in the first page (12), this self-imposed label is indeed suitable not only for the 
extradiegetic ordination just explained, manifested through metalepses, but also for the 
intradiegetic time, that is, in what the narrative “tense” of the novel is concerned, because, 
                                                          
96 “Narrative is a doubly temporal sequence: There is the time of the thing told and the time of the narrative 
(the time of the signified and the time of the signifier)” (Christian Metz, qtd. in Genette, 33). 
97 “Tout cela, se peut-il que je l’aire alors pensé? De telles idées ne me seraient-elles pas plutôt venues bien 




as Genette points out, “folklore narrative habitually conforms, at least in its major 
articulations, to chronological order” (1986: 36). 
In relation to the temporality of the novel, besides the asynchrony between the two 
narrative levels sketched above, Les bienveillantes deploys a very lineal and simplified 
temporal model. The intradiegetic time, or the time of the second narrative, covers 
approximately four years, from the executions by shooting in the East Front in 1941 to 
the Fall of Berlin in 1945. In the diegesis, all the occurrences are narrated with a regular 
duration, despite the usual and detailed “descriptive pauses” (Genette 1980:99) and the 
narrator’s introspections. The “tense” of the novel approximates, then, the ideal “zero 
degree” of duration, “that would be a condition of perfect temporal correspondence 
between narrative and story” (Genette 1980: 36). Hence, in matters of narrative duration, 
the diegesis is constructed primarily through a succession of scenes,98 without remarkable 
accelerations or decelerations, and it includes a single important “implicit ellipsis” or 
“chronological lacuna” (Genette 1980: 108), which concerns the night of the murder of 
Max’s mother and stepfather. The same lack of complexity is present in what refers to the 
novel’s temporal frequency, as the narrative events are exposed only once, if we exclude 
from consideration the analeptic speculations made by Weser and Clemens during their 
interrogations of Max on the mentioned murder.99 Finally, considering the temporal order 
of the events, there is no dramatic enigma other than the nature of the “amour interdit” 
announced in the preface. No temporal prolepses are noteworthy either. Nevertheless, as 
the second and main narration starts with a 29-years-old protagonist, the diegesis will 
resort to analeptic anachronisms so as to give information about his childhood and early 
                                                          
98 It could be argued that the main structuring principle for the novel, Bach’s suite, already advances this 
temporal organization, as the French term “suite” translates into English as “succession”.  
99 Such iterative passages are to be found in the section “Menuet (en rondeaux)”, for instance in pages 




youth. As has been previously pointed out, such biographical details are key for an 
empathic engagement with the protagonist, because they signify an extension in “the 
representation of a character’s subjectivity” (Suleiman 2009: 2), indispensable for 
deepening the parasocial relation. Consequently, the biographical analepses in Les 
bienveillantes would constitute another “empathy builder” in the text. In addition, in this 
case, his early life constitutes, for Max Aue, the traumatic baseline for his posterior 
implication in the Nazi regime, an implicit and subjective relation of causality that 
contributes to the understanding of his lifetime.  
Thus, from the first chapter in the second narrative, “Allemandes I et II”, Max Aue will 
introduce retrospections that could be classified, according to Genette’s taxonomy, as 
external and homodiegetic analepses, because their reach is located outside the temporal 
field of the first narrative but they deal with the same diegetic content as the latter (Genette 
1980: 61), that is to say, they are part of Max’s memories.  By means of these flashbacks, 
the readership is informed that Max’s father abandoned his family in 1921 and 
disappeared (Littell 182), an absence that the protagonist blames on his mother,100 who 
remarried a French wealthy man, Aristide Moreau and moved from Germany to the South 
of France with Max and his twin sister, Una. At age thirteen, in Antibes, where Max 
suffered from school bullying, his incestuous love with Una was discovered. As a 
consequence, their mother sent them to separate catholic boarding schools, increasing 
Max’s lifelong hatred for her101 and causing him “un cauchemar de plusieur années et 
qui, d’une certaine manière, dure encore” (190, my emphasis). After several years in the 
catholic institution, where he was physically and sexually abused,102 Maximilien 
                                                          
100 “Je ne l’avais pas tout de suite blâmée pour la disparition de mon père : cette idée-là ne s’est imposée 
que plus tard, lorsqu’elle se prostitua à ce Moreau” (343). 
101 Aue even defends that this antagonism started at birth: “Fait étrange, je m’étais révélé mortellement 
allergique au lait de son sein”  (343). 





expressed his desire to study Literature, but his mother forced him to start a career in Law 
at the university, where one of his teachers introduced him to the national-socialist 
ideology. Finally, having never renounced his love for his sister, he will consider her 
posterior marriage as treachery and that will result in his overwhelming feeling of 
solitude103 and his rejection of heterosexuality104 and marriage, as well as it will trigger 
his voluntary enlistment for the East Front.  
Aue’s biographic self-examinations, that, in a revealing structure, take place generally 
right after witnessing a brutal war scene,105 show a transgressive and distressing past that, 
according to the narrator, is indissociable from his diegetic warlike present: “Depuis mon 
enfance, j’étais hanté par la passion de l’absolu et du dépassement des limites; maintenant, 
cette passion m’avais mené au bord des fosses communes de l’Ukranie” (Littell 2006a: 
95).  For him, the war trauma is just the logic continuation of the “tendance à l’absolu”  
that, along his life, he has learned to embrace: “si la radicalité, c’était la radicalité de 
l’abîme, et si l’absolu se révélait être le mauvais absolu, il fallait néanmoins, de cella au 
moins j’étais intimement persuadit, les suivre jusqu’au bout, les yeux grands ouverts” 
(95). Hence, Aue does not leave his problems, either moral or biographic, behind, but 
magnifies them. In doing so he generates, as Radinsky diagnoses, a thematic concordance 
between his upsetting past and the horror of his historical context: “Reality is excessive, 
and Aue’s psychic world, the demons of his imagination and his metaphors are not 
incongruent with it” (2008: 77). Therefore, just like, in spite of his doubts, the anti-hero 
                                                          
103 A recurrent phrase in the novel leads the readership to think that Maximilien feels immersed in an 
absolute solitude whose only remedy is his sister’s presence and, eventually, that of his friend Voss: “Hélas 
Voss était mort, et j’étais de nouveau seul (310)”, “Puis elle [Una] raccrocha et je fus de nouveau seul”(459). 
104 “Lorsque je regardais des filles [...] je me disais: À quoi bon, ce n’est pas elle et ce ne le sera jamais. 
Mieux vaut donc que moi-même je sois elle et tous les autres, moi” (192). 
105 For exemple, after describing a scene about the victims of an air attack in Stalingrad, Max relates the 
anguish of this situation to the anxiety of his own childhood memories: “À travers cette engoisse des images 
du passé remontaient comme des noyés après un naufrage, une par une, de plus en plus fréquentes. C’étaient 




will never abandon his Nazi militance, he will not renounce his deep hatred for his mother, 
his search for his father106 or his desire to be loved back by his sister again. In fact, in 
more than one occasion, Max tries to link his implication in the Third Reich project to his 
family issues, as if the first was a copying mechanism or a clue to solve the latter. For 
exemple, the evening before committing matricide, Max reasons: “au fond, le problème 
collectif de Allemands, c’était le même que le mien ; eux aussi, ils peinaient à s’extraire 
d’un passé douloureux, […] C’est ainsi qu’ils en étaient venus à la solution radicale entre 
toutes, le meurtre, l’horreur pénible du meurtre. Mais le meurtre était-il une solution?” 
(485). Then, as Roussel (2010) defends, the crisis of the subject merges with the historical 
crisis, creating an aesthetic tone (Adorno) of chaos and moral corruption that expresses 
the existential cul-de-sac in which Maximilien Aue is trapped. Even though the narrator 
does not explicitly justify his actions for the Reich through his conflictive past, these 
flashbacks sprinkle in the novel the boundless angst (Ercolino 2018: 254) of the 
protagonist: a tragic pathos provoked by his “passion pour le radical et l’absolu” (Littell 
2006a: 95). The novel’s thematic investment in this pain, conducted through external 
analepses, facilitates the co-suffering of the readership, that is to say their em-pathos, 
with the negative character. In addition, to stress the effect of “permanent shock” 
(Ercolino 2018: 254) in the reception and to go into detail in Max’s characterization, his 
family memories are employed, by means of the hypotext (Aktulum, 34) to which they 
remit, to provide a moral reading of the protagonist and of the text as a whole. Therefore, 
an insight on the thematic aspect of the narration, based mainly on Aeschylus’ The 
Eumenides and influenced by Hannah Arendt’s philosophical opinions on “the banality 
                                                          
106 As Roussel indicates: “les figures du père et de la mère sont omniprésentes tout au long du roman, dans 
les souvenirs comme dans les rêves” (163). In effect, Max seems to live in the shadow of this absent paternal 
figure, seeking for an impossible validation, as this passage evokes: “Tu as mûri. Ton père aurait été fier.” 





of evil”, will permit this narratological analysis of Les bienveillantes to conclude with 
some remarks on the literary encounter with Evil proposed by Littell as a possibly 
illuminating and “regressively cathartic” experience (Ercolino).  
4.2.4. THEMATIC STRUCTURE: THE BANALITY OF EVIL  
 
Turning to the metaphoric association between the text and the texile,107 as Sanyal states 
(2010: 57), the character-narrator’s job in the lace industry seems to anticipate the dense 
intertextual net that his memoirs will weave. Among the literary references that the novel 
incorporates, the last play of Aeschylus’ trilogy Oresteia, The Eumenides, is the most 
obvious one, as well as the most relevant in thematic and hermeneutic terms. As a great 
part of the novel’s critique has established,108 the Aue’s familial saga is a re-writing, that 
is, a hypertext,109 of Aeschylus tragedy: like Orestes, Max kills his mother and stepfather 
to take revenge for his father’s disappeareance, he has an incestous relation with his sister 
(Una/ Electra) and an omnipresent friend (Pylades/ Thomas) (Grethlein 2009:78). In the 
Greek drama, because of the murders he has commited, Orestes is pursued by The Furies: 
feminine personifications of revenge and justice who defend a relentless morality and 
apply divine retributions to criminals. In the Oresteia, goddess Athenea convinces the 
Furies to stop harassing Orestes, and, in order to prevent the fury inherent in their name, 
she re-baptizes them with the Greek antiphrasis “eumenides”, what is to say “the kindly 
ones” or, in French, “les bienveillantes”. 
                                                          
107 As Barthes brilliantly indicated :  “Tout texte est un intertexte ; d'autres textes sont présents en lui, à des 
niveaux variables, sous des formes plus ou moins reconnaissables: les textes de la culture antérieure et ceux 
de la culture environnante; tout texte est un tissu nouveau de citations révolues” (1974: 6, my emphasis).  
108 See Grethlein (2009) or Hall (2016). 
109 Hypertextuality can be defined as "any relation uniting a text B (that Genette calls hypertext) with a 




Leaving the plot similarities aside, this hypertextual relation has been regarded as opening 
up multiple ethical and interpretative horizons within Littell’s novel. For instance, literary 
theorists such as H. Meretoja (2016: 389) or  J. Delorme (2010: 37) have wondered who 
is to assume, in this revision of Orestes’s tragedy, the role of the righteous Furies. As J. 
Grethlein notes (2010: 79), the obvious equivalents to these ancient deities in Littell’s 
fiction are the French policemen, Weser and Clemens, who go after Aue vigorously 
during the second half of the plot. Nonetheless, as the critic also states (82), this solution 
would be incomplete, because in the closing of the novel, right after the murder of both 
officers, the protagonist solemnly states: 
J’étais triste, mais sans trop savoir pourquoi. Je ressentais d’un coup tout le poids 
du passé, de la douleur de la vie et de la mémoire inaltérable, je restais seul avec 
l’hippopotame agonisant, quelques austruches et les cadavres, seul avec le temps et 
la tristesse et la peine du souvenir, la cruauté de mon existance et de ma mort encore 
à venir. Les bienveillantes avaient retrouvé ma trace. (894, my emphasis) 
When interpreting this last paragraph, whose inclusion of the title provides the novel with 
a structural symmetry, all the critics cited above have coincided that the referred-to 
bienveillantes are “these sad thoughts that will haunt Aue” (Grethlein 2010: 79). In line 
with this, the exercise of writing his sad memories down, “s’avérerait un moyen grâce 
auquel l’ex-bourreau parviendrait en quelque sorte à se déprendre de ses démons 
mémoriels qui le poursuivent sans cesse” (Delorme 2010 :37). Without aiming to 
contradict these two substantiated interpretations, but wanting to take them a step 
forward, I identify, as it will be further developed in the next paragraphs, a third possible 
symbolic bienveillantes within the narrative act: Aue’s readership. 
As both Suleiman and Meretoja have pointed out, in the novel, “through the Orestes myth, 




assumption of the Ancient Greek conception of guilt would have a dual significance. The 
Greeks considered that, legally, “we are responsible for our actions irrespective of 
whether or not we understand what we have done” (Meretoja 2016: 389). Moreover, 
whichever the punishment applied by men for said actions, it was also thought that only 
the deities —in this case the goddesses of vengeance, the Erinyes or Furies— could finally 
absolve the criminal. The wrath of the Furies, who would torment the guilty one to 
madness, could only be placated when the condemned passed a ritual by which someone 
willingly purified him from the sins committed.110 The last two interpretations provided 
above —by which the Furies/Eumenides in the novel would be at once the officers and 
Aue’s feelings of guilt, or the officers and the reader—, together with the conception of 
justice assumed by the novel, would have an impact on the narrative’s “presentation of 
the Shoah” (Grethlein 2010: 83) but also on its plea for empathic engagement and on its 
subsequent reception by the readership.  
First of all, this two readings, and specially the last one, regard the composition of the 
memoirs as an exercise of catharsis for Max, a practice whose objective would be to 
liberate himself from the guilt that, as this MA thesis has argued, is repressed in the 
protagonist but materialized through several formal aspects in the novel, such as the 
narrator’s unreliability, the ethical deviations in his focalization or the grotesque nature 
of his psychosomatic symptoms. The incapacity of the I-narrator to cope with the horror 
of the war and to assume his responsibility in it would be, thus, already present in the 
title: Aue’s traumatic shame, like the name of the Furies, is unpronounceable, because to 
                                                          
110 See the entry “Furies” in the Encyclopedia Britannica or the entry “Eumenides” in A Dictionary of 




verbalize it is to confront it.111 As a result, only the euphemism “Les bienveillantes”, the 
suppression of remorse and sadness, can be written down.  
Secondly, and in the same line of argument, if Max’s memoirs are the purifying ritual that 
the protagonist undertakes to free himself from guilt, the reader should assume the role 
of the good Samaritan ready to redeem him, that is, not the role of a Fury, but that of an 
Eumenide, a bienveillante, who as in the Oresteia, finally saves the antihero or, at least, 
judges him through the act of reading. This interpretation is apparently, once again, 
seconded by the intertextual frame of the novel, because its first line112 constitutes a 
reference to Villon’s famous Balades des Pendus:113 a poem that is, as has been 
mentioned, a request for indulgence towards the sinners. Taking into account my 
underlaying thesis that certain narrative techniques of the novel, which have been 
identified as “empathy builders”, are there to facilitate an empathic understanding of the 
immoral figure of Aue, the narratee would then be bound to humanize Aue, understand 
him sympathetically and acquire full knowledge of his evil acts for the purpose of, in the 
end, judging him. This demand on the reader would indeed concord with the final 
reflection in the novel: only in the last line, after having apprehended the whole of his 
actions, “Les bienveillantes”, the readership, would able to catch him, “retrouver ma 
trace” (894). On the whole, because of this request for an approximation to immorality, 
as Meretoja states, “the novel can be seen to give a literary form” (2016: 380) to the ideas 
of its second main intertext: Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jersusalem, whose premise is 
that Evil is to be found at the core of humanity and, therefore, it is necessary to humanize 
it in order to fully understand it.  
                                                          
111 Hannah Arendt reflects on Eichmann’s lack of remorse as follows: “it is rather hard, and certainly 
depressing, to assume that guilt and to repent” (1964: 251). 
112 “Frères humains, laissez-moi vous raconter comment ça c’est passé” (11, my emphasis).  




As Meretoja states, Littell’s novel “does not merely illustrate Arendtian theories of the 
Holocaust (which are central intertexts of the novel) but contributes in its own right” 
(380). As has been stated at the beginning of this analysis, Max Aue bases his testimony 
on the insistence on his own humanity, which is what equates him to the readership. In 
doing so, the I-narrator is echoing the considerations of the German philosopher, who 
contradicted the Jerusalem jury’s qualification of Eichmann as a “monster”114 (Arendt 
1964: 8) and highlighted his ordinary normality and the even more distressing “fearsome, 
word-and-thought-defying banality of evil” (Arendt 1964: 252, emphasis in the original). 
According to Arendt, then, the major philosophical quandary of the Holocaust, the 
greatest dimension of its horror, was not to be found in the suffering of the victims, but 
in the humanity of the Nazis.115 As Agamben puts it when commenting on Arendt’s work, 
“the ‘underman’ must matter to us more than the ‘overman’” (1999: 21). Les 
bienveillantes, as Meretoja states, offers a fictional possible world in which Arendt’s 
ideas on “the banality of evil” are put into practice in a sort of moral experiment. The 
novel demands of the reader the acceptance of immorality as part of human nature and its 
direct confrontation, as Max Aue says: “à la malheur, il faut s’y confronter […] fermer 
les yeux, ce n’est jamais une réponse” (81). By opening their eyes to immorality, Les 
bienveillantes therefore demands of the reader that s/he to “put[s] oneself at risk and 
engag[es] with that part of humanity and history that horrifies us and which we are 
tempted to demonize or repress as something completely external to us” as that, “is the 
only way of avoiding even more damaging blindness” (Meretoja 2016: 397). Moreover, 
Littell’s narration does not simply banalize Evil by displaying its inherent humanity, but 
                                                          
114 “And the more ‘the calamity of the Jewish people in this generation’ upfolded, the more grandiose 
Mr.Hausner’s rhetoric became, the most paller and ghostlike became the figure in the glass booth, and no 
finger-wagging: ‘and there sits the monster responsible for all this’ could shout him back to life” (Arendt 
1964: 8). 
115 “Suffering, of which there has been always too much on earth, is not the issue, nor is the number of 




it also universalizes it partially by anchoring it in Western thought. Like Sanyal argues, 
“Littell's emphasis on the points of contact between Western imperialism and the Nazi 
genocide echoes Arendt's analysis at numerous points” (2010: 61). In fact, by putting in 
contrast the number of victims of the Endlösung with the numbers of other European mass 
murders, as those committed by the Allies, Napoleon, or by France in the Algerian War 
(Littell 206: 20-23), the text connects genocide directly with the contemporary Western 
principles of nationalism and obedience, drawing a line of immorality that reaches all the 
way to the reader’s present time. Consequently, Littell’s “conte moral” extends and 
personalizes Arendt’s observations in Eichmann in Jerusalem and confronts the 
readership with a Nazi perpetrator. With this thematic and intertextual gesture, Littell’s 
literary project exposes its final moral: “le vrai danger pour l’humanité c’est moi, c’est 
vous” (27-28). By means of our inescapable proximity to it, horror is portrayed in its full 
extent. Only to highlight the innovative and striking nature of the novel’s historical 
engagement, it could be helpful to put this conclusive homo homini lupus in contrast with 
the moral of another “fable” dealing with the cultural memory of the Shoah, published 
the same year as Les bienveillantes: John Boyle’s The Boy in the Striped Pyjamas. 
Whereas Boyle assures that “nothing like that could ever happen again. Not in this day 
and age” (2006: 132), Littell’s narration brutally warns: “Êtes-vous certains que ça 
n’arrivera plus? Êtes-vous mêmes certains que la guerre soit finie? D’une certaine 
manière, la guerre n’est jamais finie […]” (23).  
To conclude, I would like to comment on some ways in which this final interpretation of 
Littell’s novel appears as extremely valuable to the general premises of the current MA 
thesis. As has been exposed, the thematic structure of the novel, which rests upon a 
specific corpus of previous literature dealing with Evil and justice —mainly, Aeschylus’ 




acknowledge the “horizon” (Gadamer) of a Nazi officer in order to fully apprehend his 
“possible” reality (Doležel) and be able, thus, to approximate it critically from literary 
experience. Therefore, the diegesis positions its narratees in an “interplay between 
immersiveness and critical distance” (Meretoja 2016: 371) that, just as empathy does, 
entails emotional engagement as well as a clear “self-other differentiation” (Coplan & 
Goldie 2011:5). The moral and affective exigencies of Les bienveillantes would prove, 
then, that, as Bataille defends in its seminal work Literature and Evil, comprehensive 
approximations to immorality in literature do not promote moral laxity, but, on the 
contrary, require a “hyper-morality” on the reader’s part.  
Besides, the moral dimension of the novel does not open up because of its explicit 
material, which is monopolized by the “voice” of an I-narrator who, as has been 
established, contradicts the interpretation of the memoires as an act of repentance and of 
solicitation for negative empathy. Instead, the moral investment of Les bienveillantes is 
transmitted by means of, firstly, its formal features, that I have called “empathy builders”, 
and have been studied in this section; and, secondly, by its intertextual frame, which 
“transcends the consciousness of the narrator and functions as one way in which Lit tell 
emphasizes the difference between the I-narrator and the work as a whole: the latter is not 
of Aue’s design and construction” (Meretoja 2016: 390). Thus, recovering the metaphor 
of the textile, it could be said that finally, Aue’s memoirs are like the lace to which he 
devotes his adult life: it is the absence of the textile, the blank spaces left unsaid yet 
suggested, more than the fabric itself, what determines the structure of the lace and gives 
meaning to it. By building the implicit final signification of the novel through the stylistic 
choices of the narrative, Les bienveillantes reveals itself as a perfect example of the 
rejection of the Kantian tradition of aesthetic formalism, that considers the sphere of the 




Littell’s novel constitutes, from this perspective, a paradigm of the materiality and the 
narratological basis of the affective side of texts, as well as a demonstration that, as the 
other epigraph of this MA thesis reads, “the aesthetic will be a pathway towards the fully 
ethical”116 (Ridout 2009: 65). 
In its ultimate expression, the tension between negative empathy and moral estrangement 
lies, in Meretoja’s words, “at the heart of the way in which the novel deals with the ethics 
of representing the Holocaust” (2016: 387). Due to this unprecedent proposal, whose 
cutting-edge tone has been made clear when compared to Boyle’s contemporary novel, 
Les bienveillantes pushes literature’s negotiation of History to its limits, producing one 
of “the kinds of insights into history that are possible only through fiction” (Semprún, 
qtd. in Meretoja 2016: 371). In this way, because of its representation of Nazi Germany 
from the consciousness of a perpetrator, Littell’s novel epitomizes how the “safe moral 
environment” of fiction, understood as a “moral laboratory” (Hakemulder), makes 
epistemological expansion possible. Moreover, and as regards this increase in what can 
be said and thought, Les bienveillantes stands as an instance of the enlightening 
possibilities of the Foucauldian “pensée du dehors” (Freudlieb 1995: 301, emphasis in 
the original), which, very much in accordance to Arendt’s ideas on the Holocaust,  
establishes that it is precisely by studying what has been traditionally rejected that the 
whole is understood at its best.117 All in all, Littell transforms this philosophical 
methodology into a textual practice that, in addition, deals with the most traumatic 
genocide in contemporary Western history. In doing so, the author manages to get off the 
ground a literary project as stylistically extraordinary as morally challenging: a novel that, 
                                                          
116 As Ridout explains in detail in the pages following this quote, he subscribes to the opinion that: “Ethics 
does not quite displace either aesthetics or politics. Aesthetic experience becomes the condition of 
possibility for a particular kind of ethical relationship” (2009: 66). 
117 “Étudier ce qui est rejeté et exclu pour comprendre les positivités auxquelles ça s’oppose” (Foucault 




in its affective dimension, entails at once, paradoxically, empathy for the criminal and 
historical justice “pour les morts”, as the novel dedication states.118 
 
4.3. “FRÈRES HUMAINS QUI APRÈS NOUS VIVEZ”: 
NARRATIVES OF INMORALITY IN IN COLD BLOOD AND LES 
BIENVEILLANTES  
 
After the narratological analyses carried out in the last section, which focused on the 
literary techniques promoting empathy —“empathy builders” —, the conclusion could be 
reached that, despite their thematic, stylisitc, and chronological differences, both novels 
present a major union bond: they constitute two literary invitations to overcome the social 
constraints that limit empathy to exclude those who perform immoral acts. Then, 
stemming from the premise that, as has been reasoned throughout the body of this MA 
thesis, both Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood and Jonathan Littell’s Les bienveillantes 
stand as narrative representations of negative empathy, the purpose of the present section 
is to compare, briefly, the form in which the two works deploy this heterodox affective 
engagement. The final aim of this comparison is to present a hypothesis about the way in 
which negative empathy is elicited in literature. Hence, without ignoring the obvious 
limitations of analysing only two works, this final exercice seeks to, on the one hand, 
provide a commentary on the previous academic work on “narrative empathy” (Keen) —
etiher to refute or confirm its hypotheses; and, on the other, extract possible conclusions 
on the literary representation of negative empathy: a form of “parasocial relation” (Oatley 
                                                          
118 I suscribe here to Sanyal’s reading of the novel’s epigraph, for which the narrative deployment would 




2016: 623) that “dissents from mainstream empathy” (Keen 2007: 74) and is more easily 
evoked in the realm of fiction (Keen 2007:106). 
Although both studies on the texts have been conducted in accordance to Genette’s 
canonical tripartite division of narratological traits, it is noticeable that all the literary 
resources highlighted, in the analyses above, as “empathy builders” are, to a greater or 
lesser extent, character-related devices, meaning devices oriented towards how a specific 
“fictional particular” (Doležel 1988: 476) relates to the “possible world of fiction” 
(Doležel 1998: 15) that he/she inhabits. This common orientation in the so-called 
“empathy builders” is to be expected if we take into account that, being these characters 
the “targets” (Coplan 2004:144) of the novels “stream of empathy”, their representation 
and individuation is key for the emergence of empathy in the text and, therefore, for the 
present MA thesis.  
In short, when one considers the technical choices of the novels, what is revealed is that 
the great majority of narrative tools stimulating an empathic reading are aimed at delving 
more deeply into the subject’s characterization, a decision that would, in fact, second the 
most agreed-on assertion on the narratological construction of empathy: that “empathy is 
more likely to arise […] when we are furnished with extensive and detailed knowledge 
regarding the agent and their situation” (Smith 2011: 114).119 As many other theorists 
who have reached this conclusion, Coplan explains the necessity of this trait by arguing 
that a detailed depiction of the target constitutes the most solid background for 
undertaking the imaginative process that substantiates both the act of empathizing and the 
act of reading (2004: 146). The more we know, the more we understand, and the more we 
understand, the more we can empathize.  
                                                          
119 Similar conclusions are reached in critical studies such as Suleiman’s (see 2009: 2), Coplan’s (see 2004: 




However, some critics working within the field of affect theory have directly connected 
this need for a complete portrayal of the character meant to be the object of the reader’s 
empathy with the narratological category of “voice”, asserting, as Goldie does, that in 
order to grasp the narrative of a fictive other, it is required to have “the other as narrator” 
(2000:195).120 This deduction seems indeed logical given that, as has been previously 
mentioned in this MA thesis, the “voice” is the main repository of the text’s subjectivity 
(Benveniste, qtd. in Genette 213). However, in the case of negative empathy, and taking 
into consideration the nature of the use of “voice” in the two novels analyzed here, this 
assertion can be called into question. As we have seen, the narrators in In Cold Blood and 
Les bienveillantes, fitting in the paradigms of the “hetero-extradiegetic” narrator and the 
“homo-intradiegetic” narrator, respectively, are located in the two opposite extremes of 
the scale of subjectivation that the narrative “voice” may present. In my opinion, both 
“voice” typologies collaborate, somehow, in the construction of narrative empathy. On 
the one hand, the first-person testimony of Max Aue, furnished with particularities like 
the adoption of the conative function, increments the level of intimacy between narrator 
and narratee, therefore inviting the latter, explicitly, to establish an emotional bond with 
the former. On the other hand, the depersonalization inherent to the omniscient narrator 
in In Cold Blood makes it possible for the diegesis to turn to multi-perspectivism, a 
“mood” trait that, in turn, allows the referred-to “intradiegetic empathy” to flourish: a 
subtle but powerful “empathy builder” which sets an example to the readership by 
demonstrating that, in the “possible state of affairs” (Doležel 1988:482) that the text sets 
up, it is viable to feel “empathy for the Devil” (Morton). After this brief juxtaposition of 
both uses of “voice”, we could deduce that, as Keen states, in matters of narrative empathy 
“[c]ontrasting first person with third person puts the question too broadly, with too many 
                                                          




other variables, to reach a valid conclusion” (2007: xi). Nonetheless, from my point of 
view, this assertion, that could be accurate with respect to “positive empathy” (Morelli, 
Rameson, & Lieberman, qtd. in Ercolino 2018: 244), is not equally suitable for the 
problematic case of negative empathy, which presents completely different rhetoric 
necessities.   
In contrast with the experience “positive empathy”, that could be classified as one of the 
“potentially ennobling or morally beatific feelings” (2005: 6) enunciated by Ngai, when 
confronted with negative empathy, “the subject experiences a sort of resistance against 
what is perceived as an ‘enemy request’ by the object; a resistance against the introduction 
of something unpleasurable inside of her-/himself” (Lipps, qtd. in Ercolino 2018: 245). 
Thus, as it is a radical challenge to the reader’s worldview, the narrative demand for 
negative empathy initially appears to the reader as an undesired bond or a moral 
aggression. Consequently, its achievement depends very much on the status of the 
fictional “world of the text” (Ricoeur) as a “low-threat context”, where an “optimal 
aesthetic distance creates a safe environment to engage with characters” (Oatley, qtd. in 
Koopman & Hakemulder 2015: 88). Considering then that, in Caracciolo’s words, “we 
always tend to resist immorality” (2013: 31, emphasis in the original), the presence of 
explicit moral demands on the narratee coming directly from the voice of an immoral 
narrator —as in the case of Max Aue’s request for the recognition of his humanity— 
could have the counter-productive effect of transforming this “optimal aesthetic distance” 
into an excessive “critical distance” (Gadamer) that would disturb the feeling of a non-
menacing “application” (Gadamer) necessary for negative empathy in literature. 
However, this “resistance” seems to slightly break down under the impression of 
objectivity given by an omniscient narrator as the one in In Cold Blood, where negative 




“voice”, like a filmic camera, provides the readership with an effect of freedom of opinion 
and of security that invites immersion. All in all, and despite the apparent contradiction, 
a comparison between the use of narrative “voice” in both novels seems to indicate that 
the less biased the “voice”, or the more subtle its subjectivation, the more effective is the 
sensation of “safe moral environment” (Hakemulder) needed to generate negative 
empathy.  
In spite of their different use of “voice”, however, both novels coincide in developing a 
realistic internal focalization that, as has been remarked during the narratological 
analyses, reveals itself as key for the construction of narrative empathy. This strategic use 
of “mood” in the two novels seems to echo the way the study of “narrative empathy” has 
concentrated on the emotional dimension of “point of view” (Coplan 2004: 142), a critical 
tendency that claims that “an internal perspective best promotes character identification 
and readers’ empathy” (Keen 2007: 96). This theoretical commonplace stems, probably, 
from the idea that, with the adoption of the worldview —or “horizon” (Gadamer)— of 
the fictive other that “mood” entails, the act of reading is literally mirroring the experience 
of “perspective-taking” of empathy, stressing therefore the similarities between both 
cognitive processes. In effect, in In Cold Blood, where the focalization from Perry 
constitutes the readership’ firsthand knowledge of him, as well as in Les bienveillantes, 
where the internal perspective is accompanied by a first person “voice”, what the 
protagonists witness, do, and reflect on their doings is the most direct input for the 
promotion of character identification. Moreover, the “showing” that “mood” implies, 
distinguished from the “telling” of “voice” (Genette), appears to the narratee as a more 
natural, less biased method of receiving information on the dramatis personae. Hence, 
for instance, Aue’s momentary recognitions of the Face or Perry’s acts of kindness 




their direct-speech assertions on themselves. In addition, the respective use of mono-
perspectivism and multi-perspectivism in the novels points in the same direction, as both 
techniques serve to highlight the benign qualities of the targets by means of a comparison 
with their milieu, establishing a contrast that directs the “stream of empathy”, 
respectively, towards Max and Perry. As we have seen, in the first case, this effect is 
provoked by Aue’s description of the cruel acts perpetrated by his Nazi colleagues, while, 
in the second case, it is achieved not only by means of the already mentioned 
“intradiegetic empathy”, but also by the contrast between Dick’s point of view and 
Perry’s. In the same line, the realistic style of both narrative “moods” —especially 
obvious in Aue’s status as “perpetrator-witness” (Razinsky 2008: 15) but also in both 
novels’ frequent inclusion of detailed descriptions of certain events and of the “psychic 
vividness of the prolonged inside views” (Booth, qtd. in Keen 2007:96) of both 
protagonists’ minds— appears as a key aspect for empathetic engagement, as it lays a 
solid foundation for the stability of the “possible world” of the text  (Doležel), which is 
the ground on which the imaginative processes of both reading and empathizing are 
built.121 Thus, a panoramic review of the use of narrative “mood” in both novels seems 
to, on the one hand, corroborate the opinion of affect theorists about the importance of 
textual perspective, and, on the other hand, to lay bare that, also in the case of negative 
empathy, this narratological category, if accompanied by a realistic style, becomes the 
most evident “cognitive prothesis” (Smith 2011: 110) for the enlargement of the empathic 
capacity in literature.  
                                                          
121 As Ngai illustrates by comparing emotional engagement in Melville’s The Confident Man (1857) and 
Bartleby, The Scrivener (1853) —for her, “a psychologically inscrutable character” (2005: 50)—, realism 
is one of the formal points that can more easily problematize affect (Ngai 2005:52). Being empathy a 
psychological inner process, the level of intersubjective connection that descriptive literature promotes is 
more appropriate for empathy awareness. Therefore, “narrative empathy” (Keen) gives preeminence to 
realistic literary traits such as descriptions or introspections. Because of that, in general, it is easier to 




Nonetheless, from my point of view, empathy towards “those who perform atrocious 
acts” (Morton 2011: 308) recquires not only an exposition of the characters’ present 
actions, but a more explanatory and complete insight on the motives behind their offences. 
Hence, as “it becomes harder to identify imaginatively with important parts of human 
possibility” which are “alien to one” (Keen: 2007:76), the arrangement of in-text negative 
empathy demands a further exegesis of the target’s behaviour. In my opinion, this 
necessity would increase, in the narrativization of this specific kind of “alternative 
empathy” (Pedwell), the importance of narrative “tense” and, to be more precise, of its 
retrospective temporal anachronies (Genette). Then, at least in the two novels studied in 
the current MA thesis, the strategic embedding of analepses or “flashbacks” of 
biographical content within the diegesis has been regarded as a crucial device for 
illuminating the moral deviation of the empathy focalizers. Without overlooking the fact 
that, as Butler puts it, to try to understand the reasons of Evil is not to exonerate Evil 
(2004: xiii), and therefore, that the protagonists’ pasts, if they do offer explanations to 
their present behavior, they do not necessarily redeem them, the readership’s access to 
Max and Perry’s background has, in my opinion, a twofold effect on their empathic 
perception. First, considering the agreement amongst affect theorists with respect to the 
idea that “empathetic responses to fictional characters and situations occur more readily 
for negative feeling states” (Keen 2007: 179) as shame or sadness,122 the spectacle of Max 
and Perry’s past suffering would evoke an emotional response on the reader, because 
suffering usually activates in the witness “the obligation to alleviate and recognize” it 
(Berlant 2004:2) even if, in the cases that concern us, the protagonists are simultaneously 
past objects and present agents of cruelty. Secondly, the biographic retrospections offered 
                                                          
122 In the same line of argument, Woodward states that “what elicits empathy is a narrative that conveys the 
texture of emotional experience —specifically, experience of suffering” (2004: 64), while Carroll explains 
that for some theorists, the emotive state triggering empathy “must be exclusively some negative 




by both novels allow the narration to establish a logical causal sequence of continuity 
between the protagonists’ traumatic early life and the current intradiegetic “possible state 
of affairs” (Doležel 1988: 482), marked by their immoral attitude. Therefore, from these 
reflections, based on the “tense” structure in In Cold Blood and Les bienveillantes, we 
could conclude that temporal analepses play a decisive role in the construction of negative 
empathy as they constitute, in both cases, particularly important “empathy builders”. 
However, the relevance of these temporal devices could be exclusive to negative 
empathy, and not necessarily common to “mainstream empathy” (Keen 2007: 74), where 
the reader, prompted to engage with a character worthy of our understanding and 
compassion, does not need to be furnished with such extensive antecedents.  
To conclude, this last particularity of the narrative “tense” of both novels, to wit, the 
retrospective investment in the protagonists’ past, also provides the narration with a 
thematically uniform affective atmosphere, that is to say, with an homogeneous aesthetic 
tone (Adorno). From my point of view, the “affective-aesthetic idea” (Ngai 2005: 41) of 
tone, which has been previously explored in this paper and repeatedly alluded to in the 
narratological analyses, acquires, at this point, a critical importance in the holistic 
affective dimension of both texts. Hence, following the example of S. Ngai’s study of 
“ugly feelings”, I consider the concept of tone to be necessarily linked to the emotional 
potentiality of the novels and therefore, as I will now develop, to be essential for the 
arising of negative empathy in them.  
As Ngai puts it, the idea of “tone”, that “remains notoriously difficult to define”, refers to 
“a cultural object’s affective bearing, orientation, or ‘set toward’ the world” (2005: 29) 
which, encapsulating in itself all the affective quality of the object, is generated by the 
sum of the formal and the thematic features at work in it (2005:47). Hence, the “tone” of 




projects for the narratee, an affective bearing which is not “reducible neither to the 
emotional response a text solicits form its reader nor to the representations of feelings 
within the world of the story” (2005:41), but depends on the effect created by the technical 
aspects of the diegesis. As has been remarked in the interpretation of the thematic 
structures of both In Cold Blood and Les bienveillantes, both novels transmit, through a 
matrix of narratological and thematic characteristics, a unitary tone that, from my 
perspective, helps in constructing specific fictional worlds in which negative empathy is 
more likely to arise. In the case of Capote’s masterpiece, the multiple aspects that point 
at the omnipresence of an unescapable destiny —from the tragic fate of Perry’s familiar 
saga,123 to the manipulation of temporal duration and prolepses, and the use of “parallel 
editing” in perspective— produce a general effect of anxiety, of fear in front of a 
persistent upcoming catastrophe. On the other hand, multiple devices in Littell’s Les 
bienveillantes —as the paratextual reference to a Baroque Suite, the grotesque and 
detailed style, and the association between the horror of the massacres and the 
protagonist’s lifelong transgression of moral limits— give place to an omnipresent feeling 
of unresolved chaos and subsequent distress which is inherent to the story. As we can 
observe, in both cases, “tense” structures play an important role in the homogenization of 
the aesthetic “tone”, as the analepses permit the establishment of a correspondence 
between the target character’s past and the present “state of affairs” of the novel. As a 
result of these affective configurations, the “possible worlds” in both novels seem to be 
located in a perpetual moral “state of emergency”, immanent to the text and marked, 
respectively, by fated tragedy and distressing chaos. Within these “tone” settings, the 
                                                          
123 Once again, the presence of a curse haunting Perry in made explicit in the novel by means of a third 
person, in this case, Perry’s sister, whose thoughts after having been interviewed by the police are reported 
as follows: “She had said she was afraid of Perry, and she was, but was it simply Perry she feared, or was 
it a configuration of which he was part—the terrible destinies that seemed promised the four children of 




immorality of both protagonists is in conjunction with the rest of the novel’s environment, 
in a way that their wickedness appears, in the first case, as an irremediable pre-ordered 
circumstance, and in the second one, as another upsetting element in the midst of a mad 
and Evil reality. Under these fictional circumstances, negative empathy paves its own 
path not anymore as an “alternative form” of empathy (Pedwell), but as the sole mode of 
engagement in concert with the “negative” affective world deployed by the texts.  
All in all, the concept of “tone” and its usefulness in clarifying how negative empathy is 
constructed in narrative seems to confirm the initial premise of the present MA thesis: 
that affects, as a whole, and negative empathy in particular, are neither an isolated effect 
of the reader’s perception nor simply a thematic disposition of the author, but are 
materially generated within the text my means of a series of technical devices. As the idea 
of “tone” suggests, the particular disposition of those literary traits —whose functioning 
has been the object of study of the current thesis and especially, of this section— is what 
lends a novel its ultimate significance, echoing the Nouveau Roman’s proposition that “it  
is always the form which gives to the literary work its true meaning” (Morisette 1970: 
162). Therefore, and despite their multiple differences, it could be concluded that the form 
of In Cold Blood and of Les bienveillantes asks the readership to expand their empathetic 
capacity in order to undertake, contradicting their expected moral disposition and 
challenging the narratee’s “sense of decency” (Coplan 2011: xlvii), a comprehensive 
gesture which is already requested in an intertextual reference significantly shared by 
both novels:124   
                                                          
124 “La ballade des pendus”, also known as “Villon’s epitaph”, appears in the paratext of In Cold Blood as 
the novel’s only epigraph. In the case of Les bienveillantes, Villon best-known poem is referred to, with 
subtlety, in the first line, as the novel opens with the same call to its readership as the ballade “Frères 
humanins,” (Littell 2006:13), as noticed by many critics (see Ercolino 2018: 385, Ferdjani 2010: 263 and 




Frères humains qui après nous vivez, 
N'ayez vos cœurs contre nous endurcis, 
Car, si pitié de nous pauvres avez, 
Dieu en aura plus tôt de vous merci.125 














                                                          
125 “Brothers humans, who live on after us, / don’t harden your hearts and turn away, /for if you take pity 





5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
As has been established in the introduction, the objectives of the current MA thesis were 
to give a material dimension to the premises of affect theory, to explore negative empathy 
as a narrative emotion and, through these two exercises, to vindicate the status of literary 
texts as “parasocial” worlds where affective and moral experimentation is promoted. In 
effect, a narratological approximation to In Cold Blood and Les bienveillantes has 
allowed us to examine negative empathy as an emotional effect triggered by the use of a 
set of literary devices. In this sense, it could be concluded that narrative empathy is indeed 
motivated by the formal techniques, arranged in the textual practice, which construct 
literary affects —in this case, negative empathy— just as they give form to the “possible 
world” of the text (Doležel 1988:489). Moreover, inasmuch as this emotion is, as has 
been consistently argued, initially contrary to the will of the narratee, the mere possibility 
of negative empathy would serve as an instance of how literary affects do not respond to 
the reader’s disposition, but constitute an integral part of the novel’s “‘set toward’ the 
world” (Ngai 2005:29). In the same line, a study of negative empathy has also clarified 
how entering a “possible world of fiction” (Doležel) may signify, as George Elliot 
beautifully wrote, “a mode of amplifying experience and extending our contact with our 
fellow-men beyond the bounds of our personal lot” (qtd. in Keen 2007: 54). Nonetheless, 
this broadening f our capacity to grant humanity to others that the “parasocial” status of 
literature permits could be seen as contradicting the “negative” value of the type of 
empathy we have been discussing in this MA thesis. As a result, I would like to conclude 
this project by pondering over the possibility of evaluating negative empathy as an 




Usually conceived as an unwanted and heterodox emotional response, the empathic 
comprehension of Evil characters may be perceived, during the reading act, as a 
“disgusting” reaction, to the point that it may give place to adverse affective “meta-
responses”126 (Feagin, qtd. in Ngai 2005: 10) as “discomfort, shame, or self-censorship” 
which stem from “identifying or feeling with the ‘wrong’ character” (Keep: 2007: 13). 
However, as Ngai notes, disgust and desire are “dialectically conjoint” in that the former 
has the power to allure us, particularly for its being “an object created by social taboos 
and prohibitions” (2005: 234). Thus, negative empathy is a sort of affective “counter-
discourse” (Foucault) that, at least in the case of the novels analyzed in this MA thesis, 
appears integrated in an equally “counter-discursive” literary world, in which injustice, 
horror, and depravity are constantly manifested and, somehow, denounced. However, as 
we have seen especially through Les bienveillantes, negative empathy complicates the 
given parameters of empathy as an emotion not only in what the traditional schema of 
willing empathizer/worthy target is concerned, but also because the understanding of the 
Evil other does not necessarily entail a subsequent redemption or a naturalization of his 
dreadful deeds: “you can imagine the other's suffering […] you might empathize with a 
person who has committed a terrible crime, yet feel no sympathy for you think he 
thoroughly deserves his punishment” (Coplan 2004: 145). Nonetheless, even if the final 
reaction towards the immorality of a “fictional particular” (Doležel) signifies a return to 
the reader’s moral pre-conceptions, in the internal process of “application” (Gadamer) 
and understanding of that fictional other, the “investment in social norms” (Ahmed 2014: 
56) that empathy, as all emotions, implies, has necessarily been reversed and modified in 
order to encompass the “horizon” of the character. Hence, regardless of the reader’s final 
                                                          
126 As Ngai explains it, “meta-responses” (Feagin) designate emotions which arise as a response to another 
emotion, for instance, “a meta-feeling in which one feels confused about what one is feeling” (2005:14, 




judgement, negative empathy constitutes always “a different way of knowing beyond 
traditional rationalist/positivist frameworks which have functioned historically to exclude 
or devalue marginalized people’s knowledge” (Pedwell 2014: 83). As we have explored 
during the analysis of the thematic structure of In Cold Blood, negative empathy would 
be, as a result, an affective form of the Foucauldian “pensée du dehors” (Freudlieb 1995: 
301), as its emphasis is put on the usually disregarded voice of Evil, echoing the idea that, 
regardless of their nature, “everyone has the right to speak out and make sense of his fate” 
(Kertész 1997: 5) and I would add here, the right to be listened to and understood. All in 
all, because it expresses an alternative aspect of reality and asks the reader to face it, 
negative empathy could be analyzed, uncannily, as an aesthetic experience that revitalizes 
and magnifies the democratic potentiality of empathy as an emotion. This ultimate 
capacity of negative empathy would, once again, demonstrate that reading literature is a 
“controlled experiment” that “enables us to ‘tame’ —i.e., reduce— the dissonance that is 
at the core of the human condition” (Caracciolo 2013: 24). 
Besides, the “expansionism” (Smith) that negative empathy proposes is not only 
affective, but also epistemological, as empathy acquires, as a whole, “le statut de catégorie 
philosophique crédible, non sentimentale” (Dupuis 2010: 13). As Ahmed recalls, 
deconstruction has taught us that “what is relegated to the margins” —in this case, 
immorality— “is often […] right at the center of thought itself” (2014: 4). In effect, 
through their implementation of negative empathy, In Cold Blood and Les bienveillantes 
do reverse what is expected from their correspondent plots: the story of a crime is 
recounted from the murderer’s perspective, and the Holocaust is explained by a Nazi 
officer. Because of this, the interest and innovation of both novels is very much 
determined by the moral position they assume, which not only makes readers learn “that 




fictional agents necessarily losing their human status (their humanness) in our hearts” 
(Reichman 2006: 306) but also gives knowledge about another side of reality, presented 
in the novels as a permanent and real “possibility” (Doležel) at the core of experience, 
whose humanness becomes terribly undeniable.  
As a consequence of the broadening of the reader’s affective and epistemological 
capacity, it could be concluded that, in the case of negative empathy, if the “empathic” 
aspect truly works, if understanding really takes place, the “negative” side of the 
experience is counteracted by the cathartic outcome that such “expansionism of the mind” 
(Smith) may suppose. This conclusion would be in line with Lipps’s idea that “negative 
empathy” is, in its ultimate extent, conceptually impossible, as “the artistic representation 
of the negative would ultimately affirm the positive” (Lipps, qtd. in Ercolino 2018: 246). 
Thus, the present MA thesis coincides with S. Ercolino when he asserts that, as a whole, 
even if the process of “negative empathy” cannot possibly be integrated in the category 
of the “ennobling or beatific feelings” (Ngai 2005: 6), its outcome may reveal itself as 
regressively “positive and life-affirming” (Ercolino 2018: 246). Then, as the literary 
theorist puts it: “Even in the depiction of what is miserable or disturbing, works of art 
allow us to feel the human. Art cannot turn the negative into the positive, but it can allow 
us to perceive negativity as beautiful by bringing its human dimension to the fore” 
(Ercolino 2018: 246).  
Nevertheless, a complete study of the philosophical and sociopolitical implications of 
negative empathy, which have been simply sketched above, would be the object of 
another longer and more detailed research. From this perspective, although the current 
MA thesis has attempted to produce an insightful approximation to the creation and 
functioning of negative empathy through the examination of two novels, this analysis has 




empathy may have for literary theory in general. In this sense, in addition to the 
elaboration of a genealogy of the representation of negative empathy in literature, it would 
also be interesting to delve deeper into the reception of this emotional response. Such a 
hermeneutical perspective would allow us to study, for instance, the possibility of a 
posterior prosocial action, motivated by the engagement with fictional criminal 
particulars. On the other hand, if we take into account that both In Cold Blood and Les 
bienveillantes are based on real-life events, it would also be enriching to investigate how 
the fiction/non-fiction ambiguity that both novels put into place may problematize the 
text’s quality as a “safe moral environment” (Hakemulder) and thus affect the reader’s 
empathic engagement with the characters, who are initially based on “actual universals” 
(Doležel 1988: 476). Moreover, this intersection between mimetic theory and 
hermeneutics could also foster a reflection on how the specific and universal nature of the 
crimes committed in each of the novels respectively —an isolated murder in Capote’s 
text and a historical crime against humanity in Littell’s— may condition “narrative 
empathy”. Finally, in the same line of thought, further research could be devoted to the 
role that this empathic understanding of criminals plays in the novels’ representation of 
the political concept of “State”, and the effects that this portrayal may have in the 
readership’s vision of it, as, in both cases, the crimes are somehow related to this form of 
political organization: in In Cold Blood, a crime against the State’s morality is punished 
by an equally reprehensible State, whereas in Littell’s novel, the protagonist’s crimes rest 
unpunished, as they are committed by the State itself.  
All in all, I consider that many avenues of inquiry are still to be explored in what negative 
empathy is concerned. Through a narratological reading of two narrative projects as 
ambitious as Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood and Jonathan Littell’s Les bienveillantes, 




negative empathy in the context of the “possible worlds of fiction” that can be understood, 
in turn, as “parasocial worlds”. From this point of view, however, the present MA thesis 
aspires to be only a first attempt to grasp the theoretical strength of a transgressive 
emotion that amplifies our conception of humanity by identifying it even where it is, at 
first, unrecognizable, illuminating, as a consequence, the affective and epistemological 
potentiality of literature and reminding us that, as Theodor Adorno said, “the value of 
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